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HOME-COUNTRY EFFECTS OF CORPORATE
INVERSIONS
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Abstract: This Article develops a framework for the study of the unique effects of
corporate inversions (meaning, a change in corporate residence for tax purposes) in the
jurisdictions from which corporations invert (“home jurisdictions”). Currently, empirical
literature on corporate inversions overstates its policy implications. It is frequently argued
that in response to an uncompetitive tax environment, corporations may relocate their
headquarters for tax purposes, which, in turn, may result in the loss of positive economic
attributes in the home jurisdiction (such as capital expenditures, research and development
activity, and high-quality jobs). The association of tax-residence relocation with the
dislocation of meaningful economic attributes, however, is not empirically supported and is
theoretically tenuous. The Article uses case studies to fill this gap. Based on observed
factors, the Article develops grounded propositions that may describe the meaningful effects
of inversions in home jurisdictions. The case studies suggest that whether tax-relocation is
associated with the dislocation of meaningful economic attributes is a highly contextualized
question. It seems, however, that inversions are more likely to be associated with dislocation
of meaningful attributes when non-tax factors support the decision to invert. This suggests
that policymakers should be able to draft tax-residence rules that exert non-tax costs on
corporate locational decisions in order to prevent tax-motivated inversions.
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INTRODUCTION
Much of the international tax reform discourse in the United States is
grounded in two truths: 1 First, multinational corporations’ (MNCs)
locational decisions are sensitive to home-country tax burdens. 2 High
1. See Part I, infra, for a description of U.S. tax policy discourse in this context.
2. Michael P. Devereux, The Impact of Taxation on the Location of Capital, Firms and Profit: A
Survey of Empirical Evidence 41 (Oxford Univ. Centre for Bus. Tax’n Working Paper No. 0702,
2007) (“It is clear from this accumulated evidence that taxation does play a role in affecting the
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taxes in an MNC’s home jurisdiction may induce the MNC to relocate
its tax-residence to a low-tax jurisdiction. 3 Second, having an MNC
headquartered within a jurisdiction has positive effects on the local
economy in the form of increased capital expenditures, research and
development (R&D) activities, and high-quality jobs. 4
The combination of these two truths has led to a policy argument that
U.S. tax-law should not target corporate headquarters’ locations. Taxing
an MNC based on the location of its headquarters raises a concern that
“management . . . would flee to other countries,” 5 resulting in the loss of
both the corporate tax base as well as the positive externalities
associated with having the headquarters located within the United
States. 6 This Article suggests, however, that this policy argument is
overstated for two reasons.
First, there is no reason to assume that the place of tax-residence is
also the place of the economic attributes that policymakers care about.
For example, under the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) corporate taxresidence is determined based on the place of incorporation (POI). There
is little reason to expect that the place of incorporation and the place of a
corporation’s meaningful attributes converge around a single location.
Unfortunately, much of the empirical research in this area implicitly
assumes such convergence. It is well established, however, that the
meaningful functions of the modern MNCs are decentralized. 7 Different
substantive attributes of a corporation may be located in different
jurisdictions, which are not necessarily the jurisdiction of the MNC’s tax
choices made by multinational companies.”).
3. See, e.g., Tomi Laamanen, Tatu Simula & Sami Torstila, Cross-Border Relocations of
Headquarters in Europe, 43 J. INT’L BUS. STUDS. 187 (2012) (finding that high home country taxes
increase the likelihood of corporate headquarters relocation); Johannes Voget, Relocation of
Headquarters and International Taxation, 95 J. PUB. ECON. 1067 (2011) (finding that additional
home country tax due upon repatriation of foreign earnings has a positive effect on the probability
of corporate migration).
4. Kimberly A. Clausing, Should Tax Policy Target Multinational Firm Headquarters?, 63
NAT’L TAX J. 741, 744 (2010). For a summary of such possible positive effects see id. at 744–47.
5. Tax Reform Options: International Issues: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 112th Cong.
15 (2011) [hereinafter Tax Reform Options] (statement of James T. Hines Jr., Collegiate Professor
of Law, University of Michigan Law School); id. at 9 (statement of Scott Naatjes, Vice President
and General Tax Counsel, Cargill Inc.) (stating that taxing corporations based on their place of
management would “put at risk highly mobile headquarters job and all economic benefits they
create to our Nation”).
6. See id. at 47–48 (statement of James T. Hines Jr., Collegiate Professor of Law, University of
Michigan Law School) (stating that taxing corporations based on the place of management
“discourages firms from locating management activities in a country that uses such standard, which
is not sensible if management activities are thought to be desirable”).
7. See discussion in Part II.B.1 infra.
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residence. Tax residence can be changed with no need to dislocate any
meaningful structures in the jurisdiction from which an MNC inverts.
Conversely, economic attributes of an MNC can be shifted across
borders with no corresponding change to the tax-residence. A change of
an MNC’s tax-residence (“inversion”) and a dislocation of economic
attributes in the jurisdiction from which the MNC inverts are two
distinct phenomena.
Second, even if corporate tax-residence is based on the location of
meaningful economic attributes (for example, by determining taxresidence based on the place of management or assets), there is no
reason to assume that MNCs will dislocate such attributes en masse in
order to change their tax-residence. Literature in organizational studies
suggests that meaningful corporate functions are likely to be located in
jurisdictions that offer substantive non-tax advantages, such as
developed financial markets, skilled labor force, infrastructure and other
agglomeration benefits. 8 The dislocation of real attributes is costly and
may result in the loss of agglomeration benefits. This Article suggests
that when the dislocation of real economic attributes is necessary in
order to “lose” tax-residence, tax savings may not justify the cost of such
dislocation. Stated differently, current literature fails to balance the tax
benefit expected from an inversion, with the non-tax cost associated with
arbitraging one tax regime for another. 9
A possible reason for the lack of coherence in policy implications of
inversions literature is that it lacks testable theoretical constructs. Public
finance economists have long studied the effects of taxation on
locational decisions. 10 However, there is no theoretical framework that
explains what substantive dislocations may specifically be associated
with inversion transactions. This Article aims to fill such gaps through
case study research. The aim is to develop theoretical propositions based
on observed dislocations in inversion transactions. Several case studies
of large-scale inversions are examined in order to articulate—in policy-

8. See Julian Birkinshaw et al., Why Do Some Multinational Corporations Relocate Their
Headquarters Overseas?, 27 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 681, 682 (2006) (“There are well established
theories of agglomeration in the literature, and it is now accepted that proximity to specialized labor,
complementary suppliers and customers, and access to knowledge spillovers are all important
benefits to the firm.”).
9. See Victor Fleischer, Regulatory Arbitrage, 89 TEX. L. REV. 227, 231 (2010) (explaining that
regulatory arbitrage makes sense “[s]o long as the regulatory savings outweighs the increase in
transactional costs”). For a discussion of tax-arbitrage opportunities specifically in the context of
entities’ residence and classification rules, see Diane M. Ring, One Nation Among Many: Policy
Implications of Cross-Border Tax Arbitrage, 44 B.C. L. REV. 79, 94–98 (2002).
10. For a detailed summary of this voluminous literature see Devereux, supra note 2.
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relevant terms—the possible meaningful economic effects of an
inversion in the jurisdiction from which a corporation inverts.
This Article finds that inversions driven exclusively by tax
considerations are less likely to be associated with dislocation of real
economic attributes, compared with inversions supported by non-tax
reasons. These findings are consistent with literature in organizational
studies. 11 This Article therefore suggests that policymakers should be
able to prevent inversions that lack economic substance by imposing
stricter locational rules on corporate taxation. This can be achieved, for
example, by determining corporate tax-residence based on substantive
factors (such as the place of management) rather than formal ones (such
as the place of incorporation). The Article thus situates itself within the
vast literature on “frictions.” Broadly speaking, frictions literature
postulates that abusive tax planning can be mitigated by attaching nontax costs to the planning scheme. 12 This added non-tax cost is referred to
as a “friction” that may discourage the tax-planning. 13 In the context of
this Article, such non-tax frictions would result from the requirement to
dislocate real activities away from the home jurisdiction in order to
invert. Business considerations thus would serve to deter tax-motivated
inversions.
The policy discussion on the implications of inversions gained
urgency recently with the advent of a wave of corporate expatriations
from the United States to other jurisdictions.14 Over the past five years,
multiple U.S.-based MNCs have changed their tax-residence, 15 moving
out of the U.S. to jurisdictions such as the UK, Ireland and
Switzerland. 16 One possible way to deal with the problem is to enforce
11. Julian Birkinshaw et al., supra note 8.
12. See, e.g., Leigh Osofsky, Who Is Naughty and Who Is Nice? Frictions, Screening, and Tax
Law Design, 61 BUFF. L. REV. 1057, 1059–75 (2013) (summarizing tax-frictions literature); Adam
H. Rosenzweig, Harnessing the Costs of International Tax Arbitrage, 26 VA. TAX REV. 555, 579–
80 (2007) (describing how reduced frictions associated with entity classification rules may induce
tax planning); David M. Schizer, Frictions as a Constraint on Tax Planning, 101 COLUM. L. REV.
1312, 1323–38 (2001) (offering a framework for the design of successful frictions).
13. See MYRON S. SCHOLES ET AL., TAXES AND BUSINESS STRATEGY 9 (Alana Bradley et al.
eds., 3d ed. 2004) (defining “frictions” as “transaction costs incurred in the marketplace that make
implementation of certain tax planning strategies costly”).
14. See DONALD J. MARPLES & JANE G. GRAVELLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CORPORATE
EXPATRIATIONS, INVERSIONS, AND MERGERS: TAX ISSUES 5–7 (2014) (describing the recent
inversions phenomenon).
15. For a summary of recent inversion transactions see Martin A. Sullivan, Lessons from the Last
War on Inversions, 142 TAX NOTES 861, 866 (2014).
16. MARPLES & GRAVELLE, supra note 14, at 5 (noting that “these types of inversions generally
target countries such as Ireland, Switzerland, and, more recently, the UK”).
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stricter locational tax rules. Specifically, the POI tax-residence test
enables a U.S. MNC to invert without any significant dislocation in the
U.S., simply by changing its place of incorporation. It has therefore been
suggested to tax corporations based on substantive factors, such as the
place of management or the place of assets, sales and employees. 17
Others have resisted such proposals, arguing that taxing U.S. MNCs
based on the locations of substantive attributes creates an incentive to
dislocate such attributes out of the United States in order to “lose” taxresidence (rather than to simply incorporate some place else while
maintaining the meaningful attributes in the U.S.). 18 The solution, this
group of scholars argues, is to make the U.S. corporate tax system more
“competitive” so as to eliminate the tax incentives to invert. 19 The case
studies explored in this Article suggest that the dislocation of meaningful
attributes in the context of inversion transactions is a highly contextdependent issue, and that the fear of substantive dislocations is not
always warranted.
This Article is structured as follows: Part I briefly outlines some of
the current policy considerations and legislative proposals aimed at
dealing with the problem of corporate inversions. Part II surveys current
literature on MNCs’ tax-residence locational decisions and explains the
limitations of such literature for tax policy-making. It also develops a
framework for understanding inversions in the context of tax-friction
literature. Part III explains why a case-study approach may overcome
some of the limitations of empirical research. It then executes a casestudy analysis of five events in which MNCs relocated their residences
for tax purposes. Part IV analyzes the case studies surveyed and
identifies observation-based patterns that warrant further research. This
Part also observes that frictions (or rather, lack thereof) seem to play an
important role in the decision to invert, and discusses some of the policy
implications of this finding. The Article concludes with a summary of its
limitations and caveats and a call for a more nuanced empirical approach
in the study of the meaningful effects of corporate inversions.
I.

BACKGROUND: CORPORATE INVERSIONS AND THE TAX
RESIDENCE DEBATE

The purpose of this Part is to briefly describe the phenomenon of
corporate inversions and explain why inversions are a focal point of tax
17. See infra notes 57–60 and accompanying discussion.
18. See infra notes 39–43 and accompanying discussion.
19. Id.
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policy-making. Part I.A briefly describes the history of inversions of
U.S. MNCs, and discusses one major congressional response to it. Part
I.B outlines current political discourse in the wake of current wave of
inversions.
A.

The Two Waves of Corporate Inversions

During the late 1990s through the early 2000s the United States
experienced a wave of transactions by which U.S.-based multinational
corporate groups restructured themselves as multinational groups
controlled by parents incorporated in tax havens. 20 The change of place
of incorporation was the only effect of such restructurings. No shift of
economic activity from the U.S. to the new jurisdiction followed. 21 This
period of inversions is sometimes described as the “first wave” of
corporate inversions. 22
These transactions, known as “naked inversions,” 23 were completely
tax-driven. They were made easily possible because, for tax purposes,
the United States determines the residence of corporations based on
POI. 24 Thus, reincorporation as a foreign corporation makes an MNC
“foreign” for federal income tax purposes. Such transactions were
perceived as abusive (and even an “unpatriotic tax dodge”). 25 Congress
responded with the enactment of Section 7874 of the Internal Revenue
Code in 2004. 26
Section 7874 prevents naked inversions by treating an inverted
corporation as “domestic” for tax purposes (notwithstanding its foreign
incorporation) if it is eighty percent owned by shareholders of the former
20. MARPLES & GRAVELLE, supra note 14, at 54 (stating the corporations inverted primarily to
“Bermuda and the Cayman Islands were the location of many of the newly created parent
corporations—jurisdictions that have no corporate income tax but that also do have highly
developed legal, institutional, and communications infrastructures”).
21. Id. (stating that “[t]hese corporate inversions apparently involved few, if any, shifts in actual
economic activity”).
22. Zachary R. Mider, Medtronic Is Biggest Yet to Renounce U.S. Tax Citizenship, BLOOMBERG
(Jun. 16, 2014, 1:01 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-06-16/medtronic-is-biggest-firmyet-to-renounce-u-s-tax-status.html (describing the late 1990s to the early 2000s period as “the first
wave of corporate inversions”).
23. MARPLES & GRAVELLE, supra note 14, at 3 (stating that an “inversion [that] does not require
any change in the effective control of the corporation, . . . is referred to as a ‘naked inversion’”).
24. I.R.C. § 7701(a)(4) (2012).
25. Hale E. Sheppard, Flight or Fight of U.S.-Based Multinational Business: Analyzing the
Causes for, Effects of, and Solutions to the Corporate Inversion Trend, 23 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS.
551, 557–58 (2003) (describing how corporate inversions were perceived by media and policy
makers in the early 2000s).
26. American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, 118 Stat. 1418.
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domestic parent. 27 If the inverted corporation is sixty percent owned by
shareholders of the former parent, then the corporation is unfavorably
taxed in the U.S. for a period of ten years on gains from dispositions of
certain assets. 28 Such tax may or may not affect the decision to invert,
depending on the particular status of the inverting corporation. For
example, if less than eighty percent but more than sixty percent of the
inverted corporation shareholders were shareholders of the old
corporation, there is no disincentive in inverting as long as the
disposition of the inverting corporation’s assets is not expected to
generate gains. In such a case no corporate tax liability is expected as a
result of the inversion.
In order to allow inversions that are not driven by tax avoidance (but
rather by real business considerations), an exception has been added to
the anti-inversion rules of Section 7874. The exception applies if the
inverted corporation has “substantial business activity” in the
jurisdiction to which it inverted.29 Section 7874 largely succeeded at
shutting down naked inversions. 30
Evidently, Section 7874 leaves two avenues open for an inversion
transaction. First, an inverting U.S. corporation may merge with a
smaller foreign-incorporated corporation, creating a foreign-incorporated
entity which is less than eighty percent owned by owners of the former
corporation, thus avoiding the eighty percent ownership threshold.
Alternatively, a U.S.-based MNC can merge with, or purchase, a smaller
foreign corporation with some activity in the foreign jurisdiction—
making the foreign corporation the parent—thus qualifying for the
“substantial business activity” exception. Under current regulatory
guidance, the “substantial business activity” exception is met if at least
twenty-five percent of the employees, assets, and sales of the combined
entity are located in the new jurisdiction. 31
U.S.-based MNCs have identified these opportunities to avoid U.S.
tax jurisdiction. Over the past several years multiple U.S. MNCs have
purchased or merged with smaller foreign corporations—incorporated in
27. I.R.C. § 7874(b) (2012).
28. I.R.C. § 7874 (defining an “expatriated entity”, among others, as an inverting corporation in
which at least sixty percent of the stock (by vote or value) are held by former shareholders.
Expatiated entities are subject to U.S. tax on “inversion gain” for a period of ten years after the
inversion. Expatriated entities are denied from using certain credits in order to reduce their inversion
gain).
29. I.R.C. § 7874(a)(2)(B)(iii).
30. MARPLES & GRAVELLE, supra note 14, at 6 (“The 2004 Act largely eliminated the generic
naked inversions.”).
31. Treas. Reg. § 1.7874-3T (2014).
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places like the UK, Ireland or Switzerland—in order to change their taxresidence. 32 Some of the most conspicuous examples include Perrigo,
the U.S. drugmaker, which acquired Irish biotech corporation Elan in an
$8.6 billion deal; 33 Medtronic, the U.S. medical devices maker, which
merged with the Irish-based Covidien (which itself inverted in 2008) in a
$42.9 billion deal; 34 and the failed attempt by Pfizer, the giant U.S.
pharmaceuticals corporation, to acquire the UK-based pharmaceuticals
company AstraZeneca in a $118 billion (!) hostile takeover. 35 This
renewed corporate expatriation activity has been dubbed the “second
wave” of corporate expatriations. 36 The continued trend of inversions
eventually prompted the Department of Treasury to respond, issuing
guidance aimed at denying some of the tax benefits associated with
inversions. 37 Whether this guidance will succeed at stopping inversions
remains to be seen. 38
B.

Current Policy Discussion on Corporate Inversions

Many have suggested that in order to deal with the problem of
inversions the United States should adopt a more “competitive” tax
system. Most prominently it has been suggested the U.S. should abandon
its system of worldwide taxation. Under the U.S. worldwide tax system,
corporate taxes are imposed on worldwide income of domestic
corporations (though foreign-sourced business income is only taxed
when repatriated).39 This is unlike most other industrialized
32. MARPLES & GRAVELLE, supra note 14.
33. Jonathan D. Rockoff, Perrigo to Buy Elan, Gain Lower Tax Rate, WALL ST. J., July 29, 2013,
at B3, available at http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887324354704578634652886726058.
34. Catherine Boyle, Medtronic $43B Covidien Deal-and Irish Tax Move, CNBC (Jun. 16, 2014,
8:25 AM) http://www.cnbc.com/id/101760661.
35. Ben Hirschler & Bill Berkort, Pfizer Walks Away from $118 Bln AstraZeneca Takeover Fight,
REUTERS (MAY 26, 2014, 11:53 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/26/us-astrazenecapfizer-idUSBREA3R0H520140526.
36. MARPLES & GRAVELLE, supra note 14, at 1–2.
37. I.R.S. Notice 2014-52.
38. See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, A World Turned Upside Down: Reflections on the ‘New
Wave’ Inversions and Notice 2014-52, 145 TAX NOTES 95 (2014) (arguing that the notice is a
helpful first step, but unlikely to turn the tide on inversions).
39. Most recently, the House Committee on Ways and Means released draft legislation for a
comprehensive tax reform that includes the adoption of a “participation exemption” system, which
is a widely adopted variant of territoriality. See STAFF OF H. COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, 113TH
CONG., DISCUSSION DRAFT OF TAX REFORM ACT OF 2014, §§ 4001–4212, available at
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/uploadedfiles/statutory_text_tax_reform_act_of_2014_discussion_
draft__022614.pdf. For a summary of the policy debate about the adoption of territorial system in
the United States and competitiveness arguments in this regard, see Omri Marian, Meaningless
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jurisdictions, which have in place some form of a “territorial” system, by
which only profits from within the jurisdiction are taxed while profits
from foreign sources are exempt. 40 Because U.S. MNCs are taxed on
repatriated profits while foreign competitors are not, it is argued that the
U.S. tax system is “uncompetitive.” 41 This problem is exacerbated by the
fact that the United States has one of the highest corporate tax rates in
the world. 42 Adopting a territorial system and reducing the U.S.
corporate tax rates, the argument goes, would put the U.S. at par with its
trading partners, thus eliminating the incentive to invert. 43
The
competitiveness
argument
is
tenuous,
however. 44
Notwithstanding the fact that the U.S. indeed has one of the highest
nominal corporate tax rates in the world (currently thirty-five percent), it
is unclear whether U.S. MNCs actually face higher effective tax burden
compared with their foreign counterparts. 45 Moreover, as many
commentators have noted, myriad loopholes in current U.S. tax law
make the U.S. tax system functionally similar to a territorial one.46
Therefore, the benefit of territoriality cannot account for the full
spectrum of inversion incentives.
Rather, it has been convincingly argued that there are other major
incentives for inversions. 47 One major reason to invert is the ability to
access untaxed foreign cash. 48 Generally, under U.S. law, income of
Comparisons: Corporate Tax Reform Discourse in the United States, 32 VA. TAX. REV. 133, 163–
67 (2012).
40. See PHILIP DITTMER, TAX FOUND., SPECIAL REPORT NO. 202: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE ON
TERRITORIAL TAXATION 3 (2012), available at http://taxfoundation.org/sites/taxfoundation.org/
files/docs/sr202_0.pdf (concluding that “[o]verwhelmingly, developed economies are turning to the
territorial approach”).
41. See Marian, supra note 39, at 150.
42. For a summary of the policy debate about corporate tax rates in United States and
competitiveness arguments in this regard, see id.
43. See MARPLES & GRAVELLE, supra note 14, at 12.
44. For a full-blown rebuttal of the argument according to which inversions are driven by
competitiveness concerns, see Edward D. Kleinbard, Competitiveness Has Nothing to Do with It,
144 TAX NOTES 1055 (2014).
45. Marian, supra note 39, at 158 (describing studies that contest the argument according to
which U.S. tax rates are uncompetitive).
46. See, e.g., J. Clifton Fleming, Jr., Robert J. Peroni & Stephen E. Shay, Worse Than Exemption,
59 EMORY L.J. 79 (2009) (describing the U.S. international tax system and suggesting that foreignsource income of U.S. MNCs is even more generously treated than foreign-source income under
territorial taxation principles); Edward D. Kleinbard, Stateless Income, 11 FLA. TAX REV. 699, 715–
27 (2011) (explaining how the U.S. tax system is an “ersatz variant on territorial systems”).
47. Kleinbard, Competitiveness Has Nothing to Do with It, supra note 44, at 1065–67 (explaining
the reasons for the current wave of inversions).
48. Id. at 1065–66 (explaining how inversions facilitate “hopscotch payments,” which allow
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foreign subsidiaries of domestic corporations is not taxed in the United
States until repatriated (generally in the form of dividends or other
payments from foreign subsidiaries). 49 U.S. MNCs thus focus their taxplanning efforts on booking income with subsidiaries in low-tax
jurisdictions, where the income remains untaxed. 50 For example, the
infamous “Double Irish Dutch Sandwich” planning technique is aimed at
shifting income associated with patented goods from the jurisdiction
where the good are designed, manufactured or sold, to tax havens. 51
Generically explained, this is achieved by having subsidiaries in taxhavens own the valuable patents of the affiliated group, and have the
affiliates in the developed (high-taxed) jurisdictions pay royalties to the
tax haven entities. The royalties are deductible and therefore strip the
tax-bases in the high-tax jurisdictions where factories and clients are
located, and the income is accumulated in the tax-haven jurisdiction,
where nothing is located other than pocket-book entities. 52
The problem for U.S. MNCs arises when they wish to access these
pools of untaxed cash. 53 If they simply repatriate the cash to the U.S.
parent, the repatriated amounts will be taxed. If, however, by the magic
of inversion, the U.S. parent becomes a “foreign” parent, the rules of
repatriation taxes no longer apply. The tax-haven entities can then make
direct payments to the foreign parent, in a foreign-to-foreign exchange
that skips U.S. taxing jurisdiction (these payments are thus appropriately
termed “hopscotch” payments), and can be used for stock buybacks or
dividends. If this inversion-related planning is successful, then the
earnings of the tax-haven subsidiaries are never taxed. 54 Recent Treasury
guidance is aimed in particular at this type of inversion benefits.55
The second benefit of inversions stems from the fact that under U.S.
tax law, “foreign” MNCs are better positioned to reduce the tax bill on
inverted firms to access previously untaxed cash held in foreign subsidiaries).
49. Of course, U.S. MNCs could theoretically avoid tax on repatriation by having foreign
subsidiaries invest directly in U.S., or buying U.S. debt. However, the IRC prevents such planning
by treating such amounts as deemed repatriated, and hence subject to tax. See I.R.C. § 956 (2012).
50. Kleinbard, Competitiveness Has Nothing to Do with It, supra note 44, at 1056 (stating that
“U.S.-domiciled multinational firms have become adroit at moving income that as an economic
matter is earned in high-tax foreign countries to very low-taxed ones”).
51. See Kleinbard, Stateless Income, supra note 46, at 706–13 (describing the Double Irish Dutch
Sandwich).
52. Id.
53. It is estimated the U.S. MNCs currently hold, in the aggregate, two trillion dollars in offshore
earnings. See Kleinbard, Competitiveness Has Nothing to Do with It, supra note 44, at 1057.
54. See id. at 1065–66 (discussing “hopscotch” transactions).
55. See IRS Notice 2014-52.
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their U.S. source income when compared with “domestic” MNCs.56 This
is so because a foreign parent is able to extract gains from U.S.
operations in the form of payments that are deductible in calculating
U.S. income (for example, interest paid by a domestic subsidiary to its
foreign parent). This means that the adoption of a territorial system is of
little help, since under such a system the U.S. will continue to tax
income earned in the United States. Thus, the incentive to invert
remains.
For this reason, some have suggested dealing with inversions by
making it harder for inverting corporations to avoid taxation on income
that is substantively generated in the United States. 57 Others have
suggested reforming the way by which the United States determines
MNCs’ residence for tax purposes. 58 Specifically, many proposals
suggest applying a “Real Seat” test that considers substantive factors in
determining residence, instead of the formal POI test currently
adopted. 59 MNCs can easily change their POI, but it might prove more
difficult to change the location of substantive attributes. The most
common proposal has been to implement a residence test based on the
central management and control (CMC), 60 which is adopted by multiple

56. See Mihir A. Desai & James R. Hines, Expectations and Expatriations: Tracing the Cause
and Consequences of Corporate Inversions, 55 NAT’L TAX J. 409, 438 (2002) (suggesting, among
other things, that “managers and shareholders allowed for the possibility of reductions in domestic
tax obligations in their consideration of the expatriation”); Bret Wells, What Corporate Inversions
Teach About International Tax Reform, 127 TAX NOTES 1345, 1367 (2010) (Studying several case
studies of corporate inversions in order to unravel the motives for inversions, and concluding at
1367 that “[t]he corporate inversion phenomenon provides clear and noncontroversial evidence that
foreign-owned firms are tax preferred whether they are competing against U.S.-owned multinational
corporations in the U.S. domestic economy or in foreign markets”).
57. For a summary of such proposals, see Bret Wells, Corporate Inversions and Whack-a-Mole
Tax Policy, 143 TAX NOTES 1429, 1433–34 (2014).
58. See, e.g., S. 1346, 112th Cong. § 103 (2011). Under the Act, a publicly traded corporation
managed “directly or indirectly, primarily within the United States . . . shall be treated as a domestic
corporation.” Id. Additional bills suggest likewise. See, e.g., S. 268, 113th Cong. § 103 (2013); S.
2075, 112th Cong. § 103 (2012); H.R. 62, 112th Cong. § 2 (2011).
59. See Omri Marian, Jurisdiction to Tax Corporations, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1613, 1619–20 (2012)
(discussing the Real Seat test).
60. For such proposals see, for example, Tax Reform Options, supra note 5, at 34–36 (statement
of Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Professor, University of Michigan Law School); STAFF OF THE JOINT
COMM. ON TAXATION, 109TH CONG., OPTIONS TO IMPROVE TAX COMPLIANCE AND REFORM TAX
EXPENDITURES 178–81 (Comm. Print 2005) (proposing the adoption of a CMC test); Kleinbard,
Stateless Income, supra note 46, at 160 (suggesting to adopt a “mind and management” residence
test). At least one commentator suggested adopting a residence test that is based on the location of
the MNC’s largest customer base. See George K. Yin, Letter to the Editor, Stopping Corporate
Inversions Sensibly and Legally, 144 TAX NOTES 1087 (2014).
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industrialized jurisdictions. 61 Such proposals have been met with
criticism grounded in the argument that under a Real Seat system of taxresidence determination, corporations would not be able to invert solely
by changing their POI and would be induced to move real activities out
of the U.S. in order to “lose” their U.S. tax-residence. 62 The next part
discusses the empirical literature supporting such criticism and identifies
its shortcomings.
II.

TAXATION AND THE LOCATION OF CORPORATE
HEADQUARTERS

This Part explains the empirical literature that purports to support the
argument according to which inversions may be associated with the
dislocation of meaningful attributes in the home jurisdiction. This
argument stands in the basis of the resistance to the adoption of a Real
Seat test for corporate tax-residence. Part II.A briefly summarizes
current empirical literature on corporate tax-residence decisions.
Drawing on research in organizational studies, Part II.B explains how
inversion literature overstates its policy implication.
A.

Empirical Literature on Corporate Inversions and Its Claimed
Policy Implications

There are several benefits in having a corporate headquarters located
within a jurisdiction.63 For example, the national pride associated with
having a well-known corporation headquartered within a jurisdiction
may produce certain political benefits. 64 In addition, a firm’s
headquarters may bring with it job creation and capital expenditure,
resulting in positive economic effects in the jurisdiction in which the
headquarters operate. 65 Headquarters are also likely “to generate
learning and innovation, since research, development, and
entrepreneurial activities” 66 happen within corporate headquarters.
Moreover, some studies find that in multinational groups, headquarters

61. See Marian, supra note 59, at 1625–26 (discussing the widespread adoption of the CMC and
similar residence tests in industrialized jurisdictions).
62. See, e.g., sources cited in supra notes 5–7.
63. Clausing, supra note 4, at 744–47 (describing the benefits of having MNC headquarters
located within a jurisdiction).
64. Id. at 744.
65. Id.
66. Id.
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locations are more profitable than other locations, 67 suggesting that
“multinational headquarters will generate larger profits, higher wages
and labor rents, and greater tax payments.” 68 It is therefore obvious that
incentives and disincentives for MNC headquarters locational decisions
are policy-relevant.
Several empirical studies have examined how taxes affect the
decisions of MNCs to locate their headquarters in one jurisdiction or
another. One recent paper by Johannes Voget questions “to what
extent . . . observed relocations [of MNCs’ headquarters] exhibit a tax
avoidance motive.” 69 Comparing a large sample of MNCs that have
inverted with MNCs that did not, Voget finds that home country tax on
profits repatriated from foreign jurisdictions increases the likelihood that
MNCs will relocate their headquarters. 70 Voget concludes with a policy
implication according to which “countries have an incentive to present
themselves as attractive locations for headquarters if hosting
headquarters has certain positive externalities like an increased demand
for skilled labor, a larger tax base, or even a better representation of the
country’s interest in the decision making of the multinational firm.” 71
Therefore, according to Voget, countries should not tax repatriated
profits.
In another paper, Huizinga and Voget study the impact of taxes on
MNC structure following international mergers and acquisitions
(M&As). 72 They test cross-border M&As involving two countries,
constructing two hypothetical tax rates for a post-merger structure,
depending on whether the post-merger parent firm is located in one
jurisdiction or the other. They find that taxes have a significant impact
on the decision of where to locate the parent, and that “[c]ountries that
impose high levels of international double taxation are less likely to
attract the parent companies of newly created multinational firms.” 73
They suggest that such a result has important policy implications since
“the international organization of the firm implies cross-border
67. Matthias Dischinger, Bodo Knoll & Nadine Riedel, There Is No Place Like Home: The
Profitability Gap Between Headquarters and their Foreign Subsidiaries, 23 J. ECON. & MGMT.
STRATEGY 369, 370 (2014) (finding empirical evidence that an over proportional part of
multinational group profits accrues with the corporate headquarters).
68. Clausing, supra note 4, at 745.
69. Voget, supra note 3, at 1067.
70. Id. at 1079.
71. Id. at 1079.
72. Harry P. Huizinga & Johannes Voget, International Taxation and the Direction and Volume
of Cross-Border M&A, 64 J. FIN. 1217 (2009).
73. Id. at 1244.
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relationships of ownership and control that are bound to affect the
internal operation of the firm and the dealings of the firm with the
affected national economies, for instance, in the form of employment.” 74
A similar study by Barrios et al., finds that MNCs’ decisions regarding
where to locate new subsidiaries are influenced by MNCs’ homecountry taxes. 75
Laaman, Simula, and Torstila analyze a data set of fifty-two crossborder headquarters relocations in Europe. 76 They suggest that inquiry
into the factors that drive headquarters relocations has important policy
implications, since corporate headquarters create various “kinds of
spillover effects to the national economy they are part of.” 77 They find
that corporate taxation plays an important role in locational decisions of
multinationals. Specifically, they find that high taxes in a home
jurisdiction serve as a “push factor” incentivizing corporations to
relocate their headquarters into jurisdictions with lower taxes (i.e., low
taxes serve as a “pull factor[]”). 78
It therefore seems that tax policymakers have good reasons to worry
about MNCs’ decisions on the locations of their headquarters. According
to the studies discussed, inversion may result not only in the loss of the
tax base, but also in the loss of important attributes associated with
having an MNC headquarters located within a jurisdiction.
B.

How Empirical Studies on Corporate Inversion Overstate Their
Policy Implications

1.

Identifying Meaningful Headquarters Relocations

The studies discussed above strongly support the assertion that MNCs
are incentivized to change their tax-residences in response to high taxes
in their countries of residence (or in response to low taxes in other
jurisdictions). However, suggesting that headquarters relocation for tax
purposes is also associated with the loss of meaningful attributes in the
jurisdiction from which MNCs invert (as these studies argue), requires a
significant logical leap. As further discussed below, 79 empirical

74. Id.
75. Salvador Barrios et al., International Taxation and Multinational Firm Location Decisions,
96 J. PUB. ECON. 946, 956 (2012).
76. Laamanen, Simula, & Torstila, supra note 3, at 188.
77. Id. at 189.
78. Id. at 204–05.
79. See discussion in Part II.B.2 infra.
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literature on inversion views headquarters locational decisions as a
binary variable (i.e., the headquarters is located either in one jurisdiction
or the other). However, the headquarters of a modern MNC can hardly
be viewed as a binary variable.
It is well established that the corporate functions of the modern MNC
are not always centralized in a single identifiable location. 80 Therefore, it
is problematic to assume that meaningful functions—the functions that
create positive economic effects that policymakers might care about—
are located in the same place as the tax-residence of an MNC (whether
before or after an inversion).
For example, organizational researchers distinguish between various
levels of corporate functions. Such functions include “obligatory
functions (general management, treasury and tax, financial reporting),” 81
“discretionary activities (value adding and control functions related to
HR, audit, corporate planning, IT),” 82 and “operational functions
(marketing, distribution and production).” 83 Each such function may
generate different attributes, and might be located in a different
jurisdiction. Therefore, it is not necessarily the case that the most
important attributes are in the jurisdiction of tax-residence, or that such
attributes may be affected by a change to tax-residence.
In addition, decentralization can be observed within each functional
level. For example, “the location of the headquarters themselves has
become increasingly scattered in recent years.” 84 Mihir Deasi suggests
that an MNC “home” is triple-faceted, divided among “managerial,”
“financial,” and “legal” homes. 85 The “managerial home” is where “the
managerial talent and key decision-makers” are located. 86 The
managerial home itself could, for example, be dispersed among several
jurisdictions, with various management functions performed in different
places. A firm’s “financial home” is the “place where its shares are
listed,” 87 which in turn dictates the rights and obligations of investors
and managers in publicly traded entities. A MNC’s “legal home” is the

80. For a summary of research on the decentralization of corporate functions, see David Collis,
David Young, & Michael Goold, The Size and Composition of Corporate Headquarters in
Multinational Companies: Empirical Evidence, 18 J. INT’L MGMT. 260, 262–63 (2012).
81. Id. at 264 (emphasis added).
82. Id. (emphasis added).
83. Id. (emphasis added).
84. Clausing, supra note 4, at 743.
85. Mihir A. Desai, The Decentring of the Global Firm, 32 WORLD ECON. 1271, 1277 (2009).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1278.
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residence of the corporation for legal purposes. 88 The legal home itself
can be divided. For example, residences for tax purposes and for
corporate-law purposes may be separately determined, creating tension
between different jurisdictional rules. 89 Each such “managerial”,
“financial” or “legal” home may be located in a different place, and each
such home may generate different types of positive attributes in the
jurisdiction in which it is located. There is no reason to expect that when
the “tax home” is changed (i.e., inversion) other “homes” will follow.
To summarize, MNCs’ operations, and specifically MNCs
headquarters’ functions are not “black boxes” with a single identifiable
location. They must be viewed as complex organizational structures.
When this is the case, it is rather a complex task to define a “relocation”
of corporate headquarters. Organizational researchers have tackled the
issue, however.
For example, Birkinshaw et al. sought to explain MNCs’ decisions to
relocate corporate headquarters and corporate business units overseas.90
They clearly distinguish among three elements that define corporate
headquarters: The first two are “a top management group that typically
has an official location at which it meets . . . [and] a series of HQ
functions . . . (treasury, investor relations, corporate communications
etc.), each one of which has an identifiable physical location.” 91 The
third is “the legal domicile” of the MNC. 92 Birkinshaw et al. recognize
that headquarters may be incorporated in one jurisdiction for tax
purposes but meaningfully operate in another. 93 They also note that
various substantive management functions may be located in different
jurisdictions. 94 They therefore conclude that it is “possible to
conceptualize the HQ’s location on some sort of continuum, from
entirely based in the home country through to entirely relocated
overseas.” 95 The degree of HQ relocation is therefore the dependent
variable in their analysis.
Birkinshaw et al. then study the spectrum of headquarters relocations

88. Id. at 1280–81.
89. For a discussion on the interaction between residence for corporate law purposes and
residence for tax purposes, see Mitchell A. Kane & Edward B. Rock, Corporate Taxation and
International Charter Competition, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1229 (2008).
90. Birkinshaw et al., supra note 8.
91. Id. at 684.
92. Id.
93. See id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
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based on case studies of forty MNCs, using multiple interviews and
questioners. 96 Such a method allows them to disaggregate management
functions and identify the geographical locations of each. They find that
business units (meaning operational functions) tend to relocate in
response to demand of local markets and in order to take advantage of
local agglomeration effects. 97 Corporate headquarters tend to
meaningfully relocate in response to the demand of shareholders and
financial markets. They acknowledge that corporate tax may play a role
in relocation decisions, but unfortunately they do not directly study it. 98
Similarly, Barner-Rasmussen, Piekkari, and Bjorkman use case
studies to identify which factors explain the relocation of specific
management functions. 99 Like Birkinshaw et al., they view headquarters
relocation on a spectrum, rather than as a binary variable. They
differentiate between “full, partial or virtual” relocation of
headquarters. 100 They define each as follows:
Full relocation means that the entire top management group and
all HQ functions are moved. Partial HQ relocation signifies that
only selected members of the top management group and
functions are transferred. Virtual relocation refers to situations
in which HQ management responsibilities are handled through
frequent travel and modern IT support systems. 101
They find that multiple factors may drive meaningful relocations, and
that such drivers may be highly contextualized. 102
Unfortunately, as explained below, 103 public-finance researchers who
have studied MNCs’ tax-residence decisions have viewed relocations of
headquarters as a binary variable. This limits the policy implications of
their studies.
2.

Revisiting the Policy Implications of Inversions Literature

The Article now turns to question the policy implications of empirical
research on inversions against the backdrop of organizational literature
96. Id. at 689.
97. Id. at 697.
98. Id. at 690.
99. Wilhelm Barner-Rasmussen, Rebecca Piekkarim, & Ingmar Björkman, Mobility of
Headquarters in Multinational Corporations, 1 EUR. J. INT’L MGMT. 260 (2007).
100. Id. at 263.
101. Id. (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
102. Birkinshaw et al., supra note 8, at 697 (discussing factors that may drive different types of
dislocations in various contexts).
103. See infra Part II.B.2.
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discussed above. Inversions researchers suggest that jurisdictions should
present MNCs with a competitive tax environment for headquarters
locations, and that noncompetitive jurisdictions risk losing important
economic attributes. This policy implication is not, however, supported
by these researchers’ empirical findings.
For example, in Voget’s study, relocation occurs “when a headquarter
firm sells its assets to a foreign company or alternatively when the firm’s
shareholders sell their shares to a foreign company in exchange for
shares or for cash.” 104 This means that Voget’s empirical findings only
explain how tax may affect the nominal change of ownership of stock or
assets. Voget’s study offers no insight into the effects of taxes on
locational decisions of meaningful headquarters functions. Using Desai’s
terminology, Voget studies the effect of taxes on legal or tax
relocations. 105 Such relocations interest policymakers due to the
associated loss of the corporate tax base. However, legal dislocations do
not necessarily entail the dislocation of economically significant
attributes (contrary to what Voget suggests).
The Huizinga and Voget study on post-merger structure assumes that
“[f]or tax purposes, the newly created multinational is resident in the
acquiring or parent country.” 106 However, such locational decision
means little in terms of where the relevant management attributes are.
Tax residence and the residence of managerial talent are two different
attributes. For example, when the U.S.-based Eaton Corporation inverted
in 2012 by merging with the Irish corporation Cooper Industries, the
post-merger parent company (“New Eaton”) was indeed located in
Ireland (a low-tax jurisdiction), 107 in line with Huizinga and Voget’s
prediction. However, in its offering documents, Eaton stated that “The
New Eaton senior management team after the acquisition and the merger
will be the same as the current senior management team of Eaton.” 108 In
other words, the merged corporation, notwithstanding the fact that it is
incorporated in Ireland, seems to be substantively managed from the

104. Voget, supra note 3, at 1069.
105. Supra notes 85–88 and accompanying text.
106. Huizinga & Voget, supra note 72, at 1226.
107. For 2012, Ireland’s corporate tax rate was 12.5%. See OECD Tax Database, OECD,
http://www.oecd.org/tax/tax-policy/tax-database.htm#C_CorporateCaptial [hereinafter: OECD Tax
Database].
108. Eaton Corp., Proxy Statement Pursuant to Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 (Schedule 14A) 100 (Sept. 14, 2012). In addition, according to Eaton’s 2013 annual report
(namely, at the end of the first full fiscal year following the transaction), all eleven board members
were U.S. nationals. See EATON CORP., ANNUAL REPORT 22 (2013).
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U.S. 109 This is inconsistent with Huizinga and Voget’s policy argument
according to which high taxes may affect dislocation of meaningful
management attributes. To be sure, it is possible that this is indeed the
case, but Huizinga and Voget’s study provides no empirical support for
such argument. Because of their definition of dependent variables, all
their study does is to explain the effect of taxes on nominal structuring
decisions.
Laaman, Simula, and Torstila’s definition of relocation is similarly
problematic. 110 Interestingly, they note the fact that the headquarters
relocation is a matter of degree, citing Barner-Rasmussen, Piekkari, and
Bjorkman. 111 Nonetheless, they explicitly choose to study virtual
relocations, ignoring that such relocations may not be associated with
relocation of meaningful attributes. They define headquarters relocation
“as the legal transfer of a firm’s corporate or regional HQ from one
country to another.” 112 They explicitly “do not require that even the top
management team itself would have to move to the new HQ location.” 113
It is therefore surprising that given their methodological choice of virtual
relocation as their dependent variable, they suggest that such relocations
may have meaningful economic effects. 114
To summarize, in formulating policy implications, current inversion
literature assumes that MNCs’ tax-residence overlaps with the place of
all the meaningful management attributes that create positive effects in
the local economy. Organizational studies do not support this
assumption and the empirical inversions research does not test it. The
most sanguine reading of empirical literature on inversions would only
support the conclusion that in response to high taxes, MNCs may engage
in tax planning (such as a scheme to change tax-residence). From a
policy-making point of view, that is not an interesting argument.
109. Conceivably, the entire management team could have moved to Ireland. However, this
would be material information the disclosure of which is required under securities laws. In the
absence of such disclosure, the assumption is that no corporate officers moved to Ireland in
connection with the inversion.
110. Laamanen, Simula, & Torstila, supra note 3.
111. Id. at 189.
112. Id. (emphasis added).
113. Id.
114. Interestingly, Laaman, Simula, and Torstila observe that actual move of managers “would
seem to be the case in most relocations.” Id. They do not provide support for such an assertion. The
case studies explored herein suggest to the contrary, namely that managers rarely move for tax
reasons alone. Rather, following tax-driven inversions managements perform minimal functions
(such as board meetings) in the new jurisdictions, in order to assure that the new tax-residence is
respected. However, in most cases they continue to reside and operate their daily business in the old
jurisdiction. See discussion on Virtual Relocations from a CMC Jurisdiction, infra Part IV.B.3.
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Rational taxpayers will always attempt to reduce their tax burdens by
using available tax-planning schemes.
Obviously, it is still possible that tax-residence planning is associated
with distorted capital allocations, causing meaningful effects. There is
no question that taxation influences decisions about where to locate
capital. 115 However, inversion studies do not show that to be the case in
the context of MNC relocations. In fact, some studies imply to the
contrary. A 2010 study by Kimberly Clausing did not find a strong
relationship between the registered location of Fortune 500 firms and
meaningful R&D activities that are usually associated with headquarters
locations. 116 Similarly, a study by Bandik, Gorg, and Karpaty did not
find a decline in the level of R&D activity in Sweden following
acquisition of Swedish corporations by foreign-owned MNCs. 117
3.

Inversions Literature Excludes Many Meaningful Relocations

There is an additional shortcoming stemming from the fact that legal
(or virtual) relocation is the dependent variable in empirical inversion
studies. By defining relocation based on tax-residence, inversion studies
exclude from their sample many meaningful relocations that are not
accompanied by a change of tax-residence.
For example, in 2004, Nokia—the Finnish communications giant—
established a corporate office in New York by substantively moving the
corporate CFO office and other key corporate management functions
from Espoo, Finland to New York. 118 At the time of the announcement
of the relocation, Nokia expected the New York headquarters to employ
approximately 100 to 150 people. 119 This move was not accompanied by
the change of the tax-residence. Nokia’s parent entity is tax-resident in
Finland to this day. Since inversion studies define relocation based on
the change of tax residence, all corporate headquarters moves that are
not associated with a change in tax residence, such as Nokia’s, are
excluded from their samples. The result is that such studies overstate the
effects of taxation on virtual headquarters moves, and do not necessarily
address the effects of taxation on meaningful headquarters moves.
115. See Devereux, supra note 2.
116. Clausing, supra note 4, at 756–60.
117. Roger Bandick, Holger Gorg & Patrik Karpaty, Foreign Acquisitions, Domestic
Multinationals, and R&D, 116 SCANDINAVIAN J. ECON. 1091 (2014).
118. Press Release, Nokia to Establish a New Corporate Office in the New York Metropolitan
Area (Dec. 17, 2003), available at http://company.nokia.com/en/news/press-releases/2003/12/17/
nokia-to-establish-a-new-corporate-office-in-the-new-york-metropolitan-area.
119. Id.
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4. Inversions and Frictions
To this point, the Article has demonstrated the shortcomings of
inversions literature. Current research does not support the argument that
taxing MNCs based on the location of their headquarters may cause
meaningful loss of economic attributes. Moreover, literature on tax
frictions possibly points to a different outcome.
Frictions are generically defined as “transaction costs incurred in the
marketplace that make implementation of certain tax planning strategies
costly.” 120 Frictions present a powerful tool for tax-writers. A successful
tax-law design in this context will create significant unavoidable non-tax
costs on unwanted tax planning, 121 without deterring desired behavior. 122
When an MNC’s Chief Executive Officer considers an inversion, she
must weigh the expected tax benefit associated with restructuring as a
foreign corporation, against the possible non-tax cost of such
restructuring. For example, if all that is required in order to “lose” tax
residence is to reincorporate in a foreign jurisdiction, there is little nontax cost to consider. 123 Reincorporation itself is almost costless, and
unlikely to require any substantive changes to business operations. In
such a case, there is no significant friction deterring the inversion, and
opportunistic tax-planning is expected.
On the other hand, if, in order to lose the tax residence, it is necessary
to relocate management, assets, and other operations overseas, the nontax cost of inverting becomes significant. The cost stems not only from
the significant expenses associated with having to move people and
assets overseas, but also from the possible loss of the benefits of
operating in the old jurisdiction. For example, there might be a good
business reason for management to be geographically close to the
MNC’s most significant customer base. Thus, moving management to a
new jurisdiction entails certain entrepreneurial risks that may not justify
the tax savings. In such a context, the MNC’s preferences regarding its

120. MYRON S. SCHOLES ET AL., supra note 13, at 9.
121. Schizer, supra note 12, at 1325 (“In sum, end runs are unlikely if, in changing the
transaction to avoid the reform, the taxpayer or an irreplaceable counterparty would suffer a
dramatic and unavoidable decline in utility, and this cost would exceed the tax benefit at issue.”).
122. See Osofsky, supra note 12, at 1072–73.
123. There might be a cost associated with having to operate under a corporate-law regime (that
of the new jurisdiction) that is not as developed as the one of the old jurisdiction. However, it
should be rather easy to find a jurisdiction with comparable corporate laws, or to contract around
undesired laws. In such a case, there is no significant non-tax friction that serves as a deterrent for
inversion. For a discussion of corporate charter competition as a possible source of friction, see
Kane & Rock, supra note 89.
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business operations serve as a friction that may deter the inversion.124 If,
however, a new customer base develops overseas, it may make sense to
move management regardless of tax, and thus tax-law does not prevent
the restructuring.
Friction literature thus points to an outcome that is possibly contrary
to the one claimed by empirical inversions literature. Namely, frictions
suggest that having corporate tax residence attached to substantive
attributes may prevent inversions, rather than cause the dislocation of the
substantive attributes. Identifying the types of attributes that are less
susceptible to dislocation may provide policymakers with a toolbox to
address the inversions problem.
III.

A CASE STUDY APPROACH TO HOME COUNTRY
EFFECTS OF CORPORATE INVERSIONS

One of the main shortcomings of current inversion literature is the
lack of a cohesive theoretical connection between the empirical findings
(which this Article does not dispute) and their proposed policy
implications. Particularly, current literature ignores the need to balance
the tax benefit of an inversion against the costs associated with
relocation of real corporate attributes. This Article attempts to fill this
theoretical gap by developing a framework for the description of
meaningful home-country effects that may be associated with corporate
inversions. Part III.A explains how case study research may address the
shortcomings in current literature, introduces the case studies selected
and explains the method of analysis. Part III.B summarizes the findings.
A.

Method and Case Selection

In order to deduce testable constructs that describe the meaningful
effects of inversions, it is not enough to look at nominal loss of tax
residence as current literature has done. There is a need for an
explorative task, aimed at unearthing meaningful changes that
policymakers may care about. For such a task, case study research is
particularly well-suited. 125 Such strategy “focuses on understanding the
dynamics present within single settings,” 126 which in the case of this

124. See Schizer, supra note 12, at 1326–27 (describing business preferences as a powerful
friction).
125. Kathleen M. Eisenhardt, Building Theories from Case Study Research, 14 ACAD. MGMT.
REV. 532 (1989).
126. Id. at 534.
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Article is an inversion transaction. The idea is to identify observable
“themes, concepts, and possibly even relationships between
variables,” 127 and use such observations to offer constructs to guide
future research. Future research may negate or support such constructs.
This Article studies the substantive home country effects of five
inversions of large MNCs. 128 The case studies represent inversions that
may reasonably be perceived to cause negative consequences in the
home jurisdictions. Each case study examines an inverted company that
is well-known in its home jurisdiction, and is a significant player in the
company’s relevant industry segment. In such cases, the loss of such
company can reasonably be perceived to result in significant
consequences. The case studies selected are aimed, however, at
generating a sample of inversions that vary in their legal, jurisdictional
and commercial characteristics. This is in order to try to articulate, in
policy-relevant terms, the meaningful relocations that commonly take
place in the specific context of inversions. The following characteristics
are considered: the jurisdictions involved (both home and target
jurisdiction); the tax system in each jurisdiction (territorial systems
versus worldwide systems); tax-residence determination in each
jurisdiction (CMC versus POI); and industry segment of the inverted
MNC.
The Article only explores inversions from one industrialized nation to
another. 129 The assumption is that inversions involving pure tax havens
are unlikely to entail dislocation of real economic attributes, since tax
havens are not positioned to support such attributes. 130 Indeed, it has
been shown that tax havens are not expected to divert real economic
activity from non-haven jurisdictions. 131 The characteristics of the
transactions studied are summarized in Table 1.

127. Id. at 541.
128. It is generally accepted that a minimum of four case studies and a maximum of ten is the
desired range of grounded-theory research. See Eisenhardt, supra note 125, at 545.
129. Relocations within jurisdictions or to small tax-havens are not explored.
130. Tax Havens are usually small countries, in population and area. See Dhammika Armapala &
James R. Hines Jr., Which Countries Become Tax Havens?, 93 J. PUB. ECON. 1058 (2009). As such,
tax havens probably lack infrastructure to support physical investment attributes of scale.
131. Mihir Desai, C. Fritz Foley & James R. Hines, Jr., Do Tax Havens Divert Economic Activity,
90 ECON. LETTERS 219, 221 (2006) (concluding that “tax havens do not appear to divert activity
from non-havens”).
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Table 1 – Characteristics of Corporate Inversion Case Studies

Target
jurisdiction

Home
jurisdiction tax
characteristics
(tax system;
residence
determination)

Target
jurisdiction tax
characteristics
(tax system;
residence
determination)

Industry of
inverting
corporation

UK

Ireland

Worldwide;
CMC

Worldwide;
CMC

Pharmaceuticals

2011

UK

Switzerland

Territorial;
CMC

Territorial;
POEM 132

Building
materials

Nobel
Biocare

2002

Sweden

Switzerland

Worldwide;
POI

Territorial;
POEM

Dental
implants

News
Corporati
on

2004

Australia

USA

Worldwide;
CMC

Worldwide;
POI

Media

Tim
Hortons

2009

USA

Canada

Worldwide;
POI

Mixed; CMC

Food
chain

Inverting
corporation

Year
completed
(fiscal)

Home
jurisdiction

Shire
Pharmaceuticals

2008

Wolseley
PLC

Changes in the home country are explored at two points in time:
immediately after the inversion (meaning, at the end of the fiscal year in
which the inversion took effect) and a year after the inversion (meaning
the end of the first full fiscal after the year of inversion). The assumption
is that by the end of the full year after the inversion, changes that are
directly attributable to the inversion have already taken effect. Of course,
it is possible that changes attributable to the inversion can be observed in
the long term, but the Article refrains from such inquiry. For long postinversion periods it should prove difficult to isolate the effects of
inversions from other factors, such as external economic effects or a
change in business strategy.
This Article uses numerous data sources to identify changes in the
home jurisdiction. Company filings and press releases are used in order
132. PEOM stands for the Place of Effective Management. In most cases, POEM is the same as
CMC. See HM Revenue & Customs, INTM 120210—Company Residence: Guidance Originally
Published in the International Tax Handbook, § ITH348 (2010), available at
http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/manuals/intmanual/intm120210.htm#IDA1ORZF (explaining the apparent
differences between CMC and POEM and concluding that “it is not that easy to divorce effective
management from central management and control and in the vast majority of cases they will be
located in the same place”). The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(“OECD”) defines POEM as “the place where key management and commercial decisions that are
necessary for the conduct of the entity’s business as a whole are in substance made.” See OECD
COMM. ON FISCAL AFFAIRS, MODEL TAX CONVENTION ON INCOME AND ON CAPITAL, C-(4)8
(2010), available at http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-Management/oecd/taxation/model-taxconvention-on-income-and-oncapital-2010_9789264175181-en.
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to articulate the drivers to, as well as the structure of, each inversion
transaction. Annual reports are used as qualitative sources describing
MNCs’ substantive operations both before and after the inversions. This
Article also draws from investigative reporting by reputable news outlets
that looked into the nature of MNCs’ operations both before and after an
inversion.
This Article also explores some quantitative data from companies’
public filings. Specifically, to the extent available, the Article
investigates financial segment reporting. MNCs are required to
separately report financial data for “material” geographic segments. 133
Often the home jurisdiction from which an MNC inverts is its historical
home, which is usually a material market for the MNC operations. The
home jurisdiction is therefore reported as a separate segment. Changes in
that segment occurring after the inversion may provide useful insights.
Unfortunately, the breadth of information contained in segment
reporting varies depending on the jurisdiction in which the MNCs’
securities are listed for trade, as well as on each MNC’s accounting
practices. However, all include, at a minimum, the book value of longlived assets (i.e., assets that provide the company with benefits
extending beyond the current fiscal year) and gross revenues in each
material segment. Some MNCs also report capital expenditures and the
number of employees in the geographical segment note. Even if not
reported in the segment note, most MNCs’ annual reports contain a
breakdown of the number of employees in each geographical segment.
Multiple data sources are used to study possible changes of
management composition following an inversion. Annual reports are
used to study management composition before and after the inversion
and to understand the reasons for any observed change in composition.
Nationality of board members is taken from the ICC Directors database
as well as other sources (such as annual reports of other firms in which
management members hold positions, and sometimes LinkedIn profiles
of management members).
Finally, all historical corporate tax rates are taken from the OECD
Tax Database. 134

133. 17 C.F.R § 229.101(d) (2014). For a discussion of the relationship between segments
reporting and tax planning, see Herita T. Akamah, Ole-Kristian Hope & Wayne B. Thomas, Tax
Haven and Disclosure Aggregation 2 (Rotman Sch of Mgmt. Working Paper No. 2419573, 2014)
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2419573 (the authors find that
MNCs that are aggressive in their tax planning tend to aggregate segments, meaning, providing
lower-quality disclosure).
134. OECD Tax Database, supra note 107.
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The findings are narratively discussed immediately below. Some
stylized facts are presented in tables following the discussion of each
case study.
B.

Results: Inversion Case Studies

1.

Shire Pharmaceuticals’ 2008 Move from UK to Ireland

Shire PLC (“Shire”) is a large MNC specializing in the development,
manufacturing, and sale of pharmaceuticals. It is a dual-listed company,
with securities traded on both the London Stock Exchange (LSE) and
NASDAQ.
Shire was founded in 1986 in the UK (“Old Shire”) and was
headquartered in Basingstoke, UK, for both tax and business purposes
until April 2008, when it announced its intention to change its taxresidence to Ireland. 135 Under the inversion plan, a new holding
company, Shire Limited (“New Shire”), was registered in the Isle of
Jersey, a tax haven. 136 New Shire “operational headquarters” as well as
tax-residence were to be located in Ireland.137 Shareholders of Old Shire
received shares of New Shire on a one-for-one basis, and New Shire
became the publicly traded entity. 138 The inversion was completed in
late May 2008. 139
Prior to announcing the inversion plan, Old Shire had significant
presence in both the U.S. and the UK but very limited presence in
Ireland. Shire’s board of executives was composed of four U.S. nationals
(including the Chairman, as well as the Chief Executive Officer), five
British nationals (including the Chief Financial Officer), and one French
national. Shire did not have a significant Irish investor base. Of its three
largest shareholders, none were Irish. 140
Shire’s operations in Ireland were also insignificant compared to
other geographical regions. For example, as of December 31, 2007,

135. Press Release, Shire PLC, Shire to Introduce a New UK Listed Holding Company (Apr. 15,
2008), available at http://www.shire.com/shireplc/uploads/press/NEWUKLISTEDHOLDING
COMPANY15Apr2008.pdf [hereinafter Shire’s Press Release].
136. See JANE G. GRAVELLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 7-5700, TAX HAVENS: INTERNATIONAL
TAX AVOIDANCE AND EVASION 4 (2013) (listing the Isle of Jersey as a tax haven).
137. See Shire’s Press Release, supra note 135.
138. Id.
139. Shire PLC, Annual Report (Form 10-K) 38 (Feb. 27, 2009) [hereinafter Shire 2008 10-K]
(noting the inversion was completed on May 23, 2008).
140. PROSPECTUS, SHIRE LTD., INTRODUCTION OF UP TO 700,000,000 ORDINARY SHARES OF 5
PENCE EACH TO THE OFFICIAL LIST 11 (Apr. 16, 2008) [hereinafter SHIRE’S PROSPECTUS].
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Shire employed 3346 personnel, of whom seventy-four percent were
based in the United States and thirteen percent were based in the UK. 141
Shire had only fifty-five employees in Ireland (about 1.6% of its global
workforce), primarily in sales and marketing operations. 142 The Irish
employees were based in a 16,000 square foot office complex in Dublin,
which accounted for about one percent of the total area of Shire’s
principal properties worldwide.143 For comparison, Shire’s UK principal
properties covered an area of 67,000 square feet, and Shire’s principal
properties in the U.S. covered an area of 1,005,000 square feet, or about
ninety percent of Shire’s reported principal properties. The U.S.
properties included all of Shire’s principal manufacturing, research and
technology centers.
According to Shire’s geographical segment reporting, 144 most of its
long-lived assets were located in the North America ($294.8 million of a
total of $368.6 million, or about eighty percent). Seventy-four percent of
its gross revenues were also produced in the U.S. ($1798.2 million of a
total of $2436.3 million). The UK was the second largest segment,
where nineteen percent of the long-lived assets were located and seven
percent of the revenues were generated.
Prior to the inversion, Ireland was not reported as a separate
geographical segment, supporting the conclusion that it was not
significant for Shire’s operations in general. Indeed, as of December 31,
2007, Shire had only $1 million of long-lived assets in Ireland (less than
one percent of Shire’s worldwide long-lived assets), and it generated less
than one percent of its worldwide revenues in Ireland.
To summarize, Ireland had no significant role in Shire’s global
operations prior to the inversion, and therefore agglomeration effects
cannot have possibly played a significant role in Shire’s decision to
move to Ireland. Rather, the move was completely tax driven. In its
press release announcing the inversion, Shire stated that given the
group’s international operations “Shire has concluded that its business
and its shareholders would be better served by having an international
holding company with a group structure that is designed to help protect

141. SHIRE PLC, ANNUAL REPORT 32 (2007) [hereinafter SHIRE 2007 ANNUAL REPORT].
142. Salamander Davoudi & Andrew Jack, Shire Deals Blow to UK as It Moves Tax Domicile to
Ireland, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 16, 2008, 3:00 AM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/051e289c-0b4c11dd-8ccf-0000779fd2ac.html.
143. All of the data about Shire’s 2007 principal properties is taken from Shire’s Prospectus,
supra note 140, at 298.
144. For Shire’s geographical segment reporting data, see SHIRE PLC, ANNUAL REPORT 115–17
(2008) [hereinafter SHIRE 2008 ANNUAL REPORT].
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the group’s taxation position, and better facilitate the group’s financial
management.” 145
Shire’s effective tax rate for 2007 was rather low, at 11.9%. 146
However, Shire’s effective tax rates for 2006 and 2005 were quite
substantial, at 26.8% and 27.5%, respectively. 147 Shire did not disclose
the expected effect of the inversion on the group’s effective tax rate.
However, the incentive to adopt Irish tax residence in lieu of the UK one
was rather obvious: At the time, the UK tax system was a worldwide
system, meaning that a resident UK MNC was subject to tax in the UK
on its worldwide income. 148 The UK corporate income tax was
substantial, at thirty percent. 149 This created an incentive for UK MNCs
to “lose” their UK tax residence (in which case they would only be taxed
in the UK on income derived from sources within the UK) and establish
residence in a lower-tax jurisdiction. While Ireland was also a
worldwide tax jurisdiction, Ireland’s corporate tax rate at the time was
12.5%. 150
Under UK law, tax-residence of corporations is determined based on
two alternative tests: the POI, or the CMC. 151 The satisfaction of either
would result in UK tax-residency. This means that in order to “lose” its
UK tax-residence Shire had to take a two-step approach. First, it had to
reincorporate some place other than the UK. This is rather easy to
achieve, and indeed, Shire had changed its place of incorporation to the
Isle of Jersey, a tax haven. 152
Second, Shire had to change its place of central management and
control. Changing the place of central management and control may
seem more challenging. Under UK law, the place of central management
is, broadly speaking, the place where the highest level of control of the
business of the company is directed. 153 Presumably then, managers
145. Shire’s Press Release, supra note 135 (emphasis added).
146. In fact, the rate in 2007 was negative 4.0%. The 11.9% figure excludes the impact of a onetime charge made in respect of a specific investment. See Shire PLC, Annual Report (Form 10-K)
53 (Feb. 25, 2007) [hereinafter Shire 2007 10-K].
147. Id. at 60.
148. The UK changed its system from worldwide to territorial in July of 2009. See infra note 185
and accompanying discussion.
149. Historical Corporate Tax Rates are taken from the OECD Tax Database, supra note 107.
150. Id.
151. HUGH J. AULT & BRIAN J. ARNOLD, COMPARATIVE INCOME TAXATION: A STRUCTURAL
ANALYSIS 435 (3d ed. 2010).
152. See supra notes 136–37 and accompanying text.
153. Christiana HJI Panayi, United Kingdom, in RESIDENCE OF COMPANIES UNDER TAX
TREATIES AND EC LAW 817, 826–27 (Guglielmo Maisto ed., 2009).
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would actually have to move someplace else, dislocating real
management attributes, in order for Shire to “lose” its UK status. This is
the type of behavioral incentive that opponents of the Real Seat tests are
worried about. Indeed, when discussing the planned inversion, Shire’s
CEO explicitly differentiated Shire’s planned inversion from naked
inversions that were common practice in the U.S. in the early 2000s. He
explained: “[t]he era of paper transactions and occasional board
meetings in order to have intellectual property in the Caymans, Bermuda
and the Bahamas has ended, with a shift to substance over form.” 154 This
strongly implies that a real, economically significant move would have
had to take place in order to shift Shire’s tax-residence.
However, in stark contrast to such a story, Shire took great care to
assure its various stakeholders that no substantive changes were
expected to take place as a result of the inversion. Shire assured its
shareholders that “[t]he new holding company . . . will have the same
Board and management team as [Old] Shire and there will be no
substantive changes to corporate governance and investor protection
measures.” 155 Shire also stated that the inversion “will not result in any
changes in the day to day conduct of Shire’s business.” 156
Indeed, Shire’s board composition hardly changed following the
inversion. While some personnel changes have occurred, the national
composition of board members remained largely the same. Following
the inversion, Shire’s board included four Americans (including the
Chairman), five British nationals (including the CEO as well as the
CFO), and one French national, just as before the inversion. The
following year (2009), two American and one British board members
left, and one American has been appointed. In other words, British
residents maintained majority in Shire’s board.
While Shire had to have its central management and control in Ireland
in order to have gained residence there, not a single board member
moved to Ireland, nor was any Irish board member appointed. An
investigation by the Guardian newspaper into Shire’s post-inversion
operations suggested that as of February 2009, Shire had approximately
seventy employees in its Dublin office (about two percent of its global
workforce), none of whom were involved in the “central management”
of Shire. 157 For comparison, Shire’s UK headquarters employed a staff
154.
155.
156.
157.

Davoudi & Jack, supra note 142.
Shire’s Press Release, supra note 135.
Id.
Tax Gap Reporting Team, Tracking Down the Addresses of the Irish Headquarters, THE
GUARDIAN, Feb. 10, 2009, at 13.
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of 300 at the time. 158 It therefore seems that at the strategic corporate
level, the relocation has been completely virtual.
Given that both the UK and Ireland determine the place of residence
based on the central management and control test, this seems odd. How
is it that no significant dislocation of corporate-level functions can be
observed in the UK following Shire’s inversion? The answer seems to be
that Shire felt comfortable that its place of central management and
control would be based in the place of board meetings. 159 The place of
board meetings is viewed as having an important (even if not
determinative) role in concluding where the place of central
management is. 160 Indeed, Shire instituted a $9271 budget to support
executives’ travels for board meetings in Ireland.161 Of the five board
meetings that took place in the year following the inversion, three took
place in Ireland, and two in the U.S. It appears that three board meetings
were enough to substantiate tax-residence in Ireland. 162
An examination of Shire’s geographical segment reporting and annual
reports tells a similar story. 163 In the years following the inversion, the
bulk of Shire’s work force remained in North America, with about
seventy-two and seventy-three percent of the work force employed there
in 2008 and 2009 respectively (compared to seventy-three percent before
the inversion). The UK workforce also maintained its size. Prior to the
inversion, Shire employed 458 employees in the UK (thirteen percent of
the global work force). It employed 452 and 465 employees in the UK in
2008 and 2009 respectively (twelve percent of the global workforce for
both 2008 and 2009).
Following the inversion, Shire’s only principal property in Ireland
remained the same 16,000 square feet office complex in Dublin. 164
Shire’s occupation of properties in the UK did not suffer a loss, and even

158. Id.
159. See SHIRE 2008 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 141, at 45 (“In this regard the Board noted that
as Shire is tax resident in Ireland it is obligated to hold all its Board meetings outside the UK, and as
such there will always be an element of travel time before it can hold an urgent ad hoc.”).
160. Panayi, supra note 153, at 830.
161. SHIRE 2008 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 144, at 59 (“In addition, to recognize the travel
required for Directors to attend meetings in Ireland or the US, a $9,271 travel allowance was
instituted for travel exceeding four hours.”).
162. Id.
163. For Shire’s geographical segment reporting see, supra note 144.
164. All of the data about Shire’s principal properties is taken from the following sources: For
2007, Shire 2007 10-K, supra note 146, at 3510-K; for 2008, SHIRE 2008 10-K, supra note 139, at
36; for 2009, Shire PLC, Annual Report (Form 10-K) 35 (Feb. 26, 2009) [hereinafter Shire 2009 10K].
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increased following the inversion. The area covered by Shire-reported
principal properties in the UK in 2008 increased to 88,500 square feet,
and increased in 2009 to 148,000 square feet. Most of Shire’s occupied
properties remained in the U.S. (1,039,000 square feet in 2009). All of
Shire’s main research and manufacturing facilities remained in the U.S.
until the end of 2009, as was the case prior to the inversion.
North America also remained the location of most of Shire’s longlived assets (eighty-seven percent, representing an increase of about
seven percent for both 2008 and 2009) and gross revenues (seventy-six
percent and seventy-one percent in 2008 and 2009 respectively). The
UK remained the second most significant geographical segment with
eleven percent and twelve percent of the long-lived assets in 2008 and
2009 respectively and five percent of the revenues in both years. In
nominal terms, in the year of the inversion the U.K. assets decreased by
$7.2 million, but in the following year UK assets increased to a level
higher than before the inversion. In terms of their proportional part of
Shire’s global assets, the UK has seen a decrease from seventeen to
eleven percent in both 2008 and 2009. Ireland remained marginal with
less than one percent of both long-lived assets and gross revenues.
It is therefore clear that, from the UK’s perspective, the only result of
Shire’s inversion to Ireland was the loss of the UK tax-base. There were
no overall noteworthy changes, positive or negative, to Shire’s economic
activities in the UK. One report summarized that Shire was able to move
to Ireland (for tax purposes) with “[n]o change to strategy. No change to
dividend policy. No staff relocation or job losses.” 165
Some of the geographical data of Shire’s global activities before and
after the inversion are summarized in Table 2. UK, the home country
from which Shire inverted, is highlighted.

165. Andrew Hill, Shire’s Shift in Tax Residency Is a Warning to the UK, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 15,
2008, 8:07 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/035ff9f2-0b1c-11dd-8ccf-0000779fd2ac.html.
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Table 2 – Summary of Shire’s activity by geographical segment before and after the
inversion
2007

2008 (Inversion
announced and
completed)

2009

American

4

4

3

British

166

5

4

1

1

1

10

10

8

458 (13%)

452 (12%)

465 (12%)

2,533 (74%)

2,714 (72%)

2,829 (73%)

445(13%)

603(16%)

581(15%)

3,436 (100%)

3,769 (100%)

3,875 (100%)

not reported

70 170 (2%)

Board
Members’
Nationality

5

French
Total
Employees

167

UK
North America
Rest of the world
Total
Ireland

168

55

169

(2%)

Properties
(sq. ft.) 171
UK

67,000 (6%);
Basingstoke, UK,
Global HQ

88,500 (8%);
Basingstoke, UK, UK
HQ

148,000 (9%);
Basingstoke, UK, UK
HQ

US

1,005,000 (90%);
Offices,
manufacturing,
research and
distribution facilities

1,039,000 (91%);
Offices, manufacturing,
research and
distribution facilities

1,357,000 (86%);
Offices, manufacturing,
research and
distribution facilities

Ireland

16,000 (1%); office
space

16,000 (1%); Dublin,
Ireland—Global HQ

16,000 (1%); Dublin,
Ireland—Global HQ

Canada

34,000 (3%); office
space

Not reported

35,000 (2%); office
space

166. One non-executive director who lived in London in the relevant period is counted as British,
though she possibly holds U.S. citizenship.
167. These figures are taken from Shire’s respective annual reports for 2007, 2008, and 2009.
168. The number of Irish employees is taken from the Tax Gap Reporting Team, supra note 157.
While Ireland was reported as a separate segment in Shire’s annual reports, Irish employees were
not reported separately. It is therefore possible that such employees are included in the UK figures.
169. Supra note 142.
170. This figure was current as of February 2009. See Tax Gap Reporting Team, supra note 157.
171. The data for Shire’s occupied properties is taken from the following sources: Shire 2007 10K, supra note 146, at 3510-K; Shire 2008 10-K, supra note 139, at 3610-K; Shire 2009 10-K, supra
note 164, at 3610-K.
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Germany

Not reported

Not reported

16,500 (1%); office
space

Brazil

Not reported

Not reported

14,000 (1%); office
space

Total

1,122,000 (100%)

1,143,500 (100%)

1,585,500 (100%)

1.4 (<1%)

1.0 (<1%)

0.7 (<1%)

Long Lived
Assets ($
million)
Ireland
UK

68.8 (19%)

61.6 (11%)

79.5 (12%)

North America

294.8 (80%)

468.6 (87%)

593.5 (87%)

3.6 (1%)

6.6 (1%)

6.9 (1%)

368.6 (100%)

537.8 (100%)

680.6 (100%)

Ireland

16.2 (1%)

17.8 (1%)

19.5 (1%)

UK

177 (7%)

160 (5%)

163.9 (5%)

North America

1798.2 (74%)

2299.6 (76%)

2141.3 (71%)

Rest of the
World

444.9 (18%)

544.8 (18%)

683 (23%)

2436.3 (100%)

3022.2 (100%)

3007.7 (100%)

Rest of the
World
Total
Gross Revenues
($ million)

Total

2.

Wolseley PLC’s 2010 Move from the UK to Switzerland

Wolseley PLC (“Wolseley”) is the world’s largest distributor of
heating and plumbing products to professional contractors and a leading
supplier of building materials to the professional market. 172 Its shares are
traded on the LSE. Wolseley was founded in 1887 in Australia, 173 and
moved to England in 1889. 174
On September 27, 2010, Old Wolseley announced its intention to
“create a new Group holding company which will be UK listed,
incorporated in Jersey and will have tax residence in Switzerland (‘New
Wolseley’).” 175 Under the plan, New Wolseley issued ordinary shares to
172. Our Story, WOLSELEY PLC, http://www.wolseley.com/index.asp?pageid=177 (last visited
Jan. 15, 2015).
173. History, WOLSELEY PLC, http://www.wolseley.com/index.asp?pageid=24&year=1880 (last
visited Jan 15, 2015).
174. Id.
175. Wolseley to Introduce a New UK Listed Holding Company, WOLSELEY PLC,
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holders of Old Wolseley shares on a one-for-one basis in exchange for
the cancellation of their Old Wolseley shares. 176 The result was that Old
Wolseley became a subsidiary of New Wolseley, a Swiss corporation for
tax purposes. The plan took effect in late 2010. 177 Since Wolseley’s
fiscal year ends on July 31, the inversion took effect in the 2011 tax
year.
Wolseley’s strategic affiliation with Switzerland was not obvious
prior to the inversion, though Wolseley did have some operations there.
Wolseley’s executive board consisted of nine British nationals
(including the Chairman, the CEO and the CFO), one American, and one
French. Wolseley also did not have a significant investor base in
Switzerland. On its annual report for 2010, Wolseley reported six
shareholders who have held substantial interests, none of which were
Swiss (though the second largest shareholder, with holdings of about
5.17% of Wolseley share capital, was a hedge fund with offices in,
among other places, Zurich). 178
Prior to announcing the inversion plan, U.S. employees accounted for
thirty-five percent of Old Wolseley’s global workforce (17,108
employees out of a total number of 48,226, employed in 1241 branches
out of a total of 4118). UK accounted for twenty-two percent (10,544
employees in 1486 branches), France eighteen percent (8831
employees), and the Nordic countries for thirteen percent (6468
employees). The Central European segment (which included
Switzerland) had 2591 employees, accounting for about five percent of
the global workforce. 179
Segment reporting also demonstrates Wolseley’s non-strategic
affiliation to Switzerland. Rather, the U.S. was Wolseley’s largest
geographical segment. The U.S. accounted for thirty-three percent of
Wolseley’s long lived assets 180 (£2304 million of a total of £7058
million), the UK accounted for seventeen percent, and the Nordic
jurisdictions accounted for twenty-five percent. Other significant
geographical segments in terms of assets were France, Canada, and

http://www.wolseley.com/index.asp?pageid=69&newsid=14 (last visited Jan. 15, 2015).
176. Id.
177. Press Release, Wolseley PLC, Results of Court and Scheme General Meeting 2 November
2010 (Nov. 2, 2010).
178. WOLSELEY PLC, ANNUAL REPORT 54 (2010) [hereinafter WOLSELEY 2010 ANNUAL
REPORT).
179. For Wolseley’s employee figures, see id. at 89.
180. For Wolseley’s geographical segment information, see WOLSELEY PLC, ANNUAL REPORT
95–98 (2011) [hereinafter WOLSELEY 2011 ANNUAL REPORT].
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Central Europe (which includes Switzerland), with thirteen, six, and five
percent, respectively, of the group’s total long-lived assets. In terms of
revenues, the U.S., the UK, and the Nordic region accounted for thirtynine percent, nineteen percent, and fifteen percent of the group’s gross
revenues, respectively. France, Canada, and Central Europe accounted
for fifteen percent, six percent, and six percent. Within the small Central
European segment, Switzerland was Wolseley’s most profitable area. 181
However, in comparison to global operations, Switzerland seems
marginal.
As in the case of Shire, it seems that agglomeration benefits played
little role in the inversion plan. In explaining the inversion, Wolseley
reasoned that the inversion is “expected to enable the Group to achieve a
competitive effective corporate tax rate” 182 of “up to 28 per cent in the
first full financial year” 183 following the inversion. A post-inversion
twenty-eight percent effective tax rate seems rather significant.
However, it represented an improvement compared to Old Wolseley’s
effective tax rate, which was thirty-four percent for 2010. 184 The main
difference from Shire’s inversion—which makes the inquiry into
Wolseley’s inversion worthwhile—is that significant tax reforms took
place in the UK by the time of Wolseley’s inversion.
In July of 2009 (before the inversion plan had been announced), the
UK effectuated a reform of its tax system, exempting most foreign
source income from UK taxation. 185 By doing so, the UK functionally
adopted a territorial system of taxation. This is of major significance, as
territoriality is frequently advocated as a remedy to the problem of
corporate inversions, with many commentators pointing to the UK as an
example. 186 The UK reform itself has been pitched as a necessary
181. WOLSELEY 2010 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 178, at 24.
182. Press Release, Wolseley PLC, Wolseley to Introduce a New UK Listed Holding Company
(Sept. 27, 2010).
183. PROSPECTUS, WOLSELEY PLC, INTRODUCTION OF UP TO 284,415,344 NEW WOLSELEY
SHARES OF 10 PENCE EACH TO THE OFFICIAL LIST 6 (2010) [hereinafter WOLSELEY’S
PROSPECTUS].
184. WOLSELEY 2010 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 178, at 27.
185. See MICHAEL P. DEVEREUX & SIMON LORETZ, CORPORATION TAX IN THE UNITED
KINGDOM 11 (2011), available at http://www.sbs.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/Business_Taxation/
Docs/Publications/Reports/corporation-tax-in-the-uk-feb-2011.pdf.
186. See, e.g., Amanda Athanasiou & David D. Stewart, News Analysis: Cheers and Jeers for
U.K. Corporate Tax Climate Post-Pfizer, TAX NOTES TODAY (June 10, 2014); Michelle Hanlon,
The Lose-Lose Tax Policy Driving Away U.S. Business, WALL ST. J., June 12, 2014, at A15 (“The
U.K. may be a good example: In 2010, after realizing that too many companies were leaving for the
greener tax pastures of Ireland, the government’s economic and finance ministry wrote in a report
that it wanted to ‘send out the signal loud and clear, Britain is open for business.’ The country made
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response to the problem of inversions by UK corporations. 187
Apparently, however, a territorial system was not enough of an incentive
to keep Wolseley from inverting. A few other UK corporations
completed inversions from the UK after the UK adopted a territorial
system. Some examples include INEOS Group LTD. (moved from the
UK to Switzerland in 2010) 188 and Brit Insurance N.V. (moved from the
UK to the Netherlands in late 2009). 189 At the same time, other
companies that had previously inverted out of the UK returned. Such
companies include The Henderson Global Investors and United Business
Media PLC, who have returned to the UK from Ireland during 2012–
2013 after making the opposite move from the UK to Ireland a few years
earlier. 190
At least theoretically, inverting out of a territorial system might be
particularly suggestive that the inversion will result in a true dislocation
of economic attributes. In a territorial jurisdiction a corporation pays
taxes only on income sourced from within that jurisdiction. 191 Moving
out of the jurisdiction would only result in a tax reduction to the extent
the inversion results in less income reported in that jurisdiction. 192 This
suggests, in theory, that less income-producing activities would take
place in the jurisdiction following the inversion. Reality, however, is
more complicated. As noted by other commentators, a complex system
of tax rules may allow foreign-owned MNCs more tax-planning
opportunities to strip income from a particular jurisdiction than
domestic-owned MNCs. 193 Inversion in such context is a “self-help”
strategy of domestic-owned MNCs to disguise themselves as foreignsubstantive tax-policy changes such as reducing the corporate tax rate and implementing a territorial
tax system.”).
187. How Other Countries Have Used Tax Reform to Help Their Companies Compete in the
Global Market and Create Jobs: Hearing Before the H. Comm. On Ways and Means, 112th Cong.
24 (2011) (statement of Stephen Edge, Partner, Slaughter & May) (describing the UK reform to
territoriality as a response to the threat of inversions).
188. Press Release, INEOS Group LTD., INEOS Move from UK to Switzerland (Apr. 13, 2010),
available
at
http://www.ineos.com/news/ineos-group/ineos-move-from-uk-to-switzerland/?
business=INEOS+Group.
189. Brit Insurance Holdings to Reorganise Its Corporate Structure and Moves to the
Netherlands, NEWS INSURANCES (Nov. 12, 2009), http://www.newsinsurances.co.uk/brit-insuranceholdings-to-reorganise-its-corporate-structure-and-moves-to-the-netherlands/01698589.
190. Athanasiou & Stewart, supra note 186.
191. See supra notes 40–43 and accompanying discussion.
192. This assumes, of course, that the expatriation is associated with real movement of economic
attributes. When expatriation is formal, it is possible that anti-abuse rules will safeguard the tax base
in that jurisdiction.
193. See supra note 46 and accompanying discussion.
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owned. This allows such domestic-owned MNCs to decrease taxes on
income earned from within their original home jurisdiction.
Indeed, in its inversion plan, Wolseley explicitly stated that “New
Wolseley will have the same business and operations after the
[inversion] as Old Wolseley has before the [inversion],” 194 and that the
inversion will cause no change “in the day-to-day operations of the
business of the Wolseley Group or its strategy.” 195 Wolseley also noted
that following the inversion, it would continue to report its financial
results in British pounds. 196
While Wolseley suggested its intention to establish and maintain
permanent staff in Switzerland, 197 such permanent staff apparently
included “as few as four people in Switzerland managing . . . treasury
operations.” 198 Wolseley also expected the move to make little
difference in the composition of its board of directors, 199 and to have the
senior executives of Old Wolseley become the senior executives of New
Wolseley. 200 While some changes to the board composition did take
place, they did not alter the board composition in a way that implies a
move of board members to Switzerland. In fact, the only change
announced prior to the inversion was that one French non-executive
director of Old Wolseley would not be appointed to New Wolseley. 201
This non-executive director was scheduled to retire regardless of the
inversion. 202 In addition, in the year in which the inversion was
completed (fiscal year 2011) three British board members had stepped
down. They were replaced by one British national and one Irish/South
African national. No Swiss nationals were appointed to Wolseley’s
board. At the end of 2012 the board comprised seven British nationals,

194. WOLSELEY’S PROSPECTUS, supra note 183, at 6.
195. Id.
196. Anita Likos & Steve, McGratch, U.K.’s Wolseley Moves Tax Residence to Switzerland,
WALL ST. J. (Sept. 27, 2010, 3:32 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/
SB10001424052748704654004575517950321881956.
197. WOLSELEY’S PROSPECTUS, supra note 183, at 6.
198. Phillip Inman, Wolseley’s Move to Swiss Tax Haven Raises Fears of Second UK Exodus,
THE GUARDIAN, Sep. 27, 2010, at 29.
199. WOLSELEY’S PROSPECTUS, supra note 183, at 6 (“New Wolseley will have the same Board
of Directors and management as Old Wolseley on the Scheme Effective Date, save that Alain Le
Goff will not be a Director of New Wolseley.”).
200. Id. at 10.
201. Id. at 46.
202. Press Release, Reckitt Benckiser Group PLC, Alain Le Goff, EVP Supply Chain, to Retire:
Successor Announced (Feb. 17, 2009), available at https://www.rb.com/site/rkbr/templates/
mediainvestorsgeneral2.aspx?pageid=288&cc=gb.
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one American, and one board member with dual Irish/South African
nationality.
To summarize, it is clear that at the corporate level, Wolseley’s
inversion was completely virtual.
At the operational level, Wolseley’s segment reporting tells a more
complex story. In the years following the inversion, the U.S. remained
Wolseley’s largest market by far, with forty-one and forty-six percent of
revenue in 2011 and 2012 respectively, and thirty-two and forty-two
percent of assets. 203 This represents a marked increase compared to U.S.
operations prior to the inversion. U.S. workforce also increased from
17,108 employees (thirty-five percent of the global workforce) to 17,822
(forty-one percent of the global workforce) by the end of 2012. 204
The UK operations, however, showed a marked decrease. In 2011,
the UK accounted for about fifteen percent of the group’s assets (a
decrease of about two percent), eighteen percent of gross revenues (a
one percent decrease), and twenty percent of the global workforce (about
a two percent decrease, or a loss of 1129 employees). These decreases
were apparently attributed to the divestment of two UK divisions,
explained in the 2011 annual report as a part of a “strategy of focusing
on businesses with significant scale and leading market positions.” 205 It
is thus not clear whether such marked losses of UK operations had
anything to do with the tax move. Such divestments continued in 2012,
causing further decrease in UK operations. By the end of fiscal year
2012, 2334 additional jobs were lost in the UK, bringing the UK
proportion of the global work force to sixteen percent (down from
twenty-two percent prior to the inversion). Also at the end of 2012, UK
only accounted for fourteen percent of global sales (compared to
nineteen percent prior to the inversion) and twelve percent of global
assets (compared to seventeen percent prior to the inversion). 206
While UK operations markedly decreased, and U.S. operations
increased, no noteworthy changes occurred in other geographical
segments. Interestingly, the central European segment (where
Switzerland is located) did not show a gain in jobs (but rather a slight
decrease) or a marked change in assets and sales. Today, three years
after the inversion, Wolseley has 744 employees in Switzerland (out of
39,286 worldwide) in 46 branches (out of 2917 worldwide). 207 This is
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

Segment information can be found at WOLSELEY PLC, ANNUAL REPORT 105–08 (2012).
Employee figures can be found at id. at 113.
WOLSELEY 2011 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 180, at 26.
These figures are based on WOLSELEY PLC, ANNUAL REPORT 114 (2012).
WOLSELEY PLC, ANNUAL REPORT (2013).
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negligible in comparison to Wolseley’s global operations.
To summarize, Wolseley, like Shire, changed little in its UK
management activities as a result of the inversion, notwithstanding that
Wolseley moved out of a territorial system and that Shire moved out of a
worldwide system of taxation. 208 The virtual-management relocation
pattern demonstrated by Shire and Wolseley has been followed closely
by multiple other UK-based MNCs who have moved from the UK. In
many such cases, UK MNCs have maintained the bulk of their
management functions in the UK and have added minimal presence (if at
all) in the jurisdictions to which they moved. 209
Wolseley did show a loss of operational attributes in the UK
following the inversion. It is impossible to tell with confidence whether
the inversion had anything to do with it, though it seems unlikely.
Wolseley inverted to Switzerland, but the loss of UK activities was not
matched by an increase in Swiss activities. The only segment showing
marked increase in the period after the inversion was the U.S.
Attributing the UK operational losses to the inversion would also
contradict Wolseley’s own assertion that no changes were expected “in
the day-to-day operations of the business of the Wolseley Group or its
strategy.” 210 It thus seems that Wolseley’s divestment of UK operations
was part of its business strategy (as the divestments were explained in its
annual reports for 2011 and 2012), and unrelated to tax considerations.
Some of the geographical data of Wolseley’s activities before and
after the inversion are summarized in Table 3.

208. One commentator summarized what Wolseley UK employees need (or need not) worry
about: “building supply depots are inherently local. Tax residence is irrelevant to their future.” See
Andrew Hill, Wolseley’s Tax Move Poses Little Threat, FIN. TIMES (Sep. 27, 2010, 8:01 PM),
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/ed074288-ca67-11df-a860-00144feab49a.html.
209. Tax Gap Reporting Team, supra note 157.
210. WOLSELEY’S PROSPECTUS, supra note 183, at 6.
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Table 3 – Summary of Wolseley’s activity by geographical segment before and after the
inversion
2010

2011 (Inversion
announced and
completed)

2012

British

9

7

7

French

1

0

0

American

1

1

1

Irish/South
African

0

1

1

11

9

9

17,108 (35%)

17,175 (37%)

17,822 (41%)

2,503 (5%)

2,645 (6%)

2,599 (6%)

UK

10,544 (22%)

9,352 (20%)

7,018 (16%)

Nordic Region

6,468 (13%)

6,535 (14%)

6,565 (15%)

France

8,831 (18%)

8,184 (18%)

7,020 (16%)

Central Europe

2,591 (5%)

2,190 (5%)

2,016 (5%)

Other

181 (<1%)

165 (<1%)

130 (<1%)

Total

48,226 (100%)

46,246 (100%)

43,170 (100%)

1,241

1,261

1,274

220

221

220

Board Members’
Nationality

Total
Employees

211

USA
Canada

Local Branches
USA
Canada
UK

1,486

1,059

919

Nordic Region

285

288

264

France

697

322

313

Central Europe

189

144

142

4,118

3,295

3,132

2,304 (33%)

2,288 (32%)

2,517 (42%)

Total
Gross Assets
(£ million)
USA

211. These numbers represent the annual average number of employees, which Wolseley
provides as part of its annual segment reporting (as opposed to the number of ongoing employees at
the end of the fiscal year, which Wolseley also reports).
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357 (5%)

382 (5%)

384 (6%)

UK

1166 (17%)

1,082 (15%)

735 (12%)

Nordic Region

1,757 (25%)

1,878 (26%)

1,465 (24%)

France

902 (13%)

1,095 (15%)

592 (10%)

Central Europe

391 (6%)

345 (5%)

297 (5%)

Other

181 (3%)

93 (1%)

42 (1%)

Total

7,058 (100%)

7,163 (100%)

6,032 (100%)

5,174 (39%)

5,500 (41%)

6,168 (46%)

765 (6%)

811 (6%)

850 (6%)

UK

2,466 (19%)

2,404 (18%)

1,898 (14%)

Nordic Region

2,012 (15%)

2,128 (16%)

2,125 (16%)

France

1,937 (15%)

1,943 (14%)

1,666 (12%)

849 (6%)

772 (6%)

714 (5%)

13,203 (100%)

13,558 (100%)

13,421 (100%)

Gross Revenues
(£ million)
USA
Canada

Central Europe
Total

3.

Nobel Biocare’s 2002 Move from Sweden to Switzerland

Nobel Biocare (“Nobel”) was founded in 1981 as Nobelpharma in
Gothenburg, Sweden. Nobel has been publicly traded since 1994 (first
on the Stockholm Stock Exchange, and since 2002 on the Swiss
exchange) and is currently the world’s largest manufacturer and
distributor of restorative esthetic dental implants.212
In April 2002, Nobel announced its plan of restructuring under which
Nobel would move its tax-residence from Sweden to Switzerland. 213
Under the plan, a new Swiss subsidiary (“New Nobel”) was incorporated
in Switzerland. New Nobel’s shares were then offered to the
shareholders of Nobel in exchange for Nobel shares on a one-to-one
basis. 214
At the time of the announcement, Sweden had a worldwide system of
taxation in place and determined the residence of corporations based on
the place of incorporation, much like the United States today. 215
212. History, NOBEL BIOCARE, http://corporate.nobelbiocare.com/en/our-company/history-andinnovations/default.aspx (last visited Jan. 1, 2015).
213. NOBEL BIOCARE, ANNUAL REPORT 28 (2002) [hereinafter NOBEL 2002 ANNUAL REPORT].
214. NOBEL BIOCARE, INTERIM REPORT 1, JANUARY–MARCH 2002, at 4 (Apr. 24, 2002).
215. Sweden adopted a participation exemption system, a variant of a territorial system, in 2003.
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Nobel outlined several reasons for the inversion. To begin with,
Nobel suggested that “[a] Swiss holding structure will allow Nobel
Biocare to optimise its corporate tax position to levels closer to
standards with other multinational companies and thereby maximising
the capital it can re-invest to grow the company and better exploit the
market potential.” 216 Nobel expected that the inversion would decrease
Nobel’s effective tax rate to twenty-five percent in the year following
the inversion, 217 from an effective tax rate of about 37.5% prior to the
inversion. 218
Nobel noted several other reasons for the move, in addition to the tax
incentive. For example, Nobel explicitly noted the move would facilitate
access to a larger “healthcare focused” investor base and better access to
capital, as well as increase liquidity. 219
Indeed, prior to the move, Nobel had a large Swiss investor base.
Nobel estimated that, as of the end of 2001 (the last complete fiscal year
prior to the inversion), forty-seven percent of its total investor base was
Swiss. 220 Nobel’s largest shareholder was BB Medtech AG, a Swiss
fund, which owned 12.7% of Nobel’s share capital. 221 Another
significant investor in Nobel was Metalor SA, a Swiss corporation, with
a holding of 7.5%. 222
Nobel’s Swiss affiliation was also apparent in the composition of its
board. Prior to the inversion, Nobel’s board comprised seven members,
of whom four were Swedish nationals, and three were Swiss nationals
(including the chairman and the deputy chairman). The CEO, appointed
in late 2001, was also a Swiss national. Prior to her appointment she
headed a Swiss corporation headquartered in Bülach, Switzerland.223

See
Foreign
Income
Portfolios:
Country
Portfolios,
BLOOMBERG
BNA,
http://taxandaccounting.bna.com/btac/T4100/split_display.adp?fedfid=14574094&vname=tmippor
&fcn=2&wsn=535732000&fn=14574102&split=0# (last visited Jan. 16, 2015).
216. Press Release, Nobel Biocare, Nobel Biocare Holding AG—New Holding Structure for
Nobel Biocare AB 2 (May 27, 2002).
217. Id.
218. Nobel Biocare, Tender Offer/Rights Offering Notification Form (Form CB) 19–20 (May 28,
2002) [hereinafter Nobel Biocare Form CB].
219. Id. at 19.
220. NOBEL BIOCARE, ANNUAL REPORT 45 (2001) [hereinafter NOBEL 2001 ANNUAL REPORT].
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. See Marcus Balogh, Heliane Canepa Sinks Her Teeth into Business, CREDIT SUISSE (Jan. 19,
2004), http://www.bank-credit-suisse-moscow.ru/ru/en/news-and-expertise/news/economy/sectorsand-companies.article.html/article/pwp/news-and-expertise/2004/01/en/heliane-canepa-sinks-herteeth-into-business.html.
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Nobel also had other business interests in Switzerland at the time of
the inversion. According to Nobel’s 2001 annual report, Switzerland was
the most penetrated market of dental implants (followed by Italy and
Sweden). 224 One of Nobel’s largest competitors, Straumann, was a Swiss
company.
It therefore seems that in addition to the tax incentive, Nobel had nontax reasons to move to Switzerland. The move would allow Nobel to be
closer to its investor base, competitors, and customers in one of the most
developed markets for its main line of business. Substantive move of
management attributes under such circumstances would be consistent
with literature in organization studies. 225 Strong local affiliation of both
investors and managers with the target jurisdiction would also
ameliorate any frictions between managers and shareholders that may
have different geographical preferences.
Nonetheless, Nobel went to a great length to assure shareholders that
it did not expect the inversion to negatively affect Nobel’s Swedish
operations. In its description of the inversion plan, Nobel explicitly
stated that the restructuring was not expected to affect Nobel employees,
that all operational headquarters functions (including R&D) would
remain in Sweden, and that production facilities would not be
affected. 226 Indeed, a comparison of the Nobel executive team in 2001
thru 2003 shows that no Swiss executives were hired following the
inversion, and that Swedish executives who left were replaced by other
Swedish executives.
Nobel also suggested that the board of directors of New Nobel would
remain largely the same as the board of directors of Old Nobel.227
However, changes occurred in Nobel’s board composition. In the year
following the inversion the board comprised five members, of whom
three were Swiss nationals (including the chairman) and two were
Swedish nationals. This national composition of board members carried
through 2003. In other words, after the inversion to Switzerland, the
board shifted from a Swedish to a Swiss majority, a marked difference
that possibly represents a significant move of management attributes.

224. NOBEL 2001 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 220, at 11.
225. See supra notes 90–98 and accompanying text.
226. NOBEL BIOCARE, INTERIM REPORT 1, JANUARY–MARCH 2002, at 4 (Apr. 24, 2002).
227. Press Release, supra note 216, at 2–3. As a rule, however, a board of directors of a Swiss
company had to consist of a majority of Swiss nationals resident in Switzerland. Nobel apparently
asked for and received an exemption from this rule by the Swiss Federal Office of Justice, provided
that at least one director authorized to represent the company would be a national and a resident in
Switzerland. See Nobel Biocare Form CB, supra note 218, at 22.

04 - Marian_final.docx (Do Not Delete)

2015]

CORPORATE INVERSIONS CASE STUDIES

4/13/2015 11:46 AM

45

This is rather surprising, since in Sweden, much like the United States, a
corporation is resident for tax purposes if it is incorporated in Sweden. 228
It thus seems that all that Nobel had to do in order to invert was to
reincorporate someplace outside Sweden and change little else.
Nonetheless, a meaningful relocation of the board of directors did occur.
Based on Nobel’s segment reporting it is hard to tell whether any
other significant economic changes took place. Sweden was not reported
as a separate segment in the relevant years, but rather was included in
the “Nordic Countries” segment. 229 Moreover, following the inversion,
Nobel stopped reporting the Nordic Countries as a separate segment, and
instead aggregated all European jurisdictions into a single segment, 230
further complicating the ability to learn of Nobel’s post-inversion
Swedish operations.
However, employment figures reported in 2001 through 2003
suggested that no significant changes occurred in the Swedish
workforce. Both before and after the inversion, for example, Nobel’s
R&D team consisted of eighty employees based in Sweden and the
U.S., 231 with the head of R&D based in Sweden. Prior to the inversion,
Sweden-based employees accounted for twenty-nine percent of a 1328strong global workforce. In 2002, Sweden accounted for thirty-two
percent of the global work force that remained unchanged in size. 232 In
2003, thirty-one percent of Nobel’s 1363 employees were located in
Sweden. 233
It is also interesting to note that prior to the inversion Nobel had five
major manufacturing facilities, located in Yorba Linda, California; Fair
Lawn, New Jersey; Stockholm, Sweden; and Karlskoga, Sweden. 234
New Nobel maintained the same production facilities.235
To summarize, Nobel’s move had some economic significance at the
very top of the corporate management, with the board transitioning to a
228. See Foreign Income Portfolios: Country Portfolios, BLOOMBERG BNA,
http://taxandaccounting.bna.com/btac/T4100/split_display.adp?fedfid=14574093&vname=tmippor
&fcn=1&wsn=535730000&fn=14574093&split=0 (last visited Jan. 16, 2015).
229. Nobel’s segment reporting for 2001–2002 (pre re-segmentation) can be found at NOBEL
2002 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 213, at 31–32.
230. Nobel’s segment reporting for 2002 (post re-segmentation) and 2003 can be found at NOBEL
BIOCARE, ANNUAL REPORT 44 (2003) [hereinafter NOBEL 2003 ANNUAL REPORT].
231. Compare NOBEL 2002 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 213, at 18 (2002), with NOBEL 2003
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 230, at 18.
232. NOBEL 2002 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 213, at 22.
233. NOBEL 2003 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 230, at 25.
234. NOBEL 2002 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 213, at 21.
235. NOBEL 2003 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 230, at 22.
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Swiss majority. At the board level, the move has been at least partial (if
not full). However, the board had a strong Swiss flavor even prior to the
move (in fact, only one new Swiss board member was appointed, while
the appointment of two Swedish board members was not renewed). At
the operational level, Nobel’s move seems to have made little (if any)
economic difference in Sweden.
Table 4 summarizes some of the data of Nobel’s global activities
before and after the inversion.
Table 4 – Summary of Nobel’s activity by geographical segment before and after the inversion
2001

2002b 236

2002a (Inversion

2003

announced and
completed)
Board
Members’
Nationality
Swedish

4

2

2

Swiss

3

3

3

Total

7

5

5

Swedish

8

10

10

American

2

2

2

Canadian

1

1

1

Swiss

1

1

1

27%

24%

25%

Senior
Executives’
Nationality

Employees

(%

of workforce) 237
Europe

236. Until 2002, Nobel Biocare comprised two primary business segments: Dental Implants and a
product named Procera. Geographic information was provided for dental implants only. After the
integration of Procera in 2002, a decision was made to change segment reporting from 2003
onwards, to include all products in geographical segment reporting. Column 2002a should therefore
be compared to column 2001, as both have figures that are exclusive of Procera. Column 2002b
represents the restated results for 2002 after the change in segments, and includes Procera. Column
2002b should therefore be compared with column 2003. See NOBEL 2003 ANNUAL REPORT, supra
note 230, at 44.
237. These numbers represent the annual average number of employees, which Nobel provides in
its annual reports (as opposed to the number of ongoing employees at the end of the fiscal year,
which Nobel regularly reports).

04 - Marian_final.docx (Do Not Delete)

2015]

4/13/2015 11:46 AM

CORPORATE INVERSIONS CASE STUDIES

47

(excluding
Sweden)
North America

34%

34%

33%

Asia/Pacific

5%

5%

6%

Other

5%

5%

5%

Sweden
Total

(Global

29%

32%

31%

1,328

1,330

1,363

workforce)
Capital
expenditures (€
thousand)
Europe

6,321 (62%)

7,365 (60%)

8,435 (62%)

8,354 (60%)

North America

2,615 (25%)

4,437 (36%)

4,653 (34%)

4,677 (34%)

191 (2%)

311 (3%)

311 (2%)

596 (4%)

Other

1,128 (11%)

178 (1%)

178 (1%)

251 (2%)

Total

10,255 (100%)

12,291 (100%)

13,577 (100%)

13,878 (100%)

Europe

109,724 (45%)

143, 572 (55%)

201,693 (62%)

256,498 (68%)

North America

Asia/Pacific

Gross Assets (€
thousand)

112,394 (46%)

95,482 (37%)

102,162 (32%)

97,650 (26%)

Asia/Pacific

9,669 (4%)

9,248 (4%)

9,248 (3%)

13,927 (4%)

Other

14,537 (6%

11,150 (4%)

11,150 (3%)

10,445 (3%)

Total

246,324 (100%)

259,452 (100%)

324,253 (100%)

378,520
(100%)

Gross Revenues
(€ thousand)
Europe

105,578 (42%)

116,569 (43%)

136,529 (44%)

157,714 (47%)

North America

95,655 (38%)

101,840 (38%)

126,580 (41%)

121,846 (36%)

Asia/Pacific

27,182 (11%)

31,390 (12%)

33,341 (11%)

37,093 (11%)

Other

23,658 (9%)

21,655 (8%)

14,740 (5%)

17,325 (5%)

Total

252,073 (100%)

271,454 (100%)

311,190 (100%)

333,978
(100%)

4.

The News Corporation Limited’s 2004 Move from Australia to the
United States

News Corporation (“News Corp.”) is a public multinational media
conglomerate. It was founded in 1923 in Adelaide, Australia as a
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publisher of a daily newspaper. 238 Since then it became a media empire
with interests in film, television, book publishing, and multiple other
media-related businesses. 239
In April of 2004, News Corp. made public its intention to change its
legal domicile and reincorporate as a Delaware company, with primary
public listing of its securities to move from the Australian Stock
Exchange to the New York Stock Exchange. 240 While the precise
scheme of the reorganization plan was somewhat complex, 241
shareholders generally exchanged their shares in the Australian News
Corp. (“Old News Corp.”) for shares in a new Delaware-incorporated
company (“New News Corp.”) on a one-to-two basis (one new share of
New News Corp. for every two shares of Old News Corp.). 242 The
reincorporation was completed in November of 2004. 243 News Corp.’s
fiscal year ends on June 30. The inversion was therefore announced in
the 2004 fiscal year, but was completed in the 2005 fiscal year.
The change of incorporation from Australia to the U.S. resulted in a
corresponding change of tax-residence from Australia to the U.S.
Significantly, however, News Corp. explicitly stated that the change in
tax-residence was not expected to have a significant effect on News
Corp.’s effective tax rates in the foreseeable future. 244 If anything, News
Corp. had to reassure shareholders that the reincorporation would not
result in an increase in effective tax rates. As a U.S. company, News
Corp. would be subjected to taxation on its worldwide income at a
thirty-five percent corporate tax rate. 245 The expert opinion supporting
the transaction stated that “[p]rima facie this is disadvantageous as,
under the [pre-inversion] structure, News Corporation is subject to tax
on its worldwide income at the Australian corporate tax rate of 30.” 246
It therefore seems that corporate-level tax-advantage was not a factor
driving the reincorporation, notwithstanding that the transaction resulted
in an inversion. The plan was driven by other factors. Rupert Murdoch,

238. See RICHARD A. GERSHON, THE TRANSNATIONAL MEDIA CORPORATION: GLOBAL
MESSAGES AND FREE MARKET COMPETITION 195 (1997).
239. The News Corp. Ltd., Report of Foreign Private Issuer (Form 6-K) app. at E-35 (Sep. 15,
2004) [hereinafter News Corp. Form 6-K].
240. Id. at 2.
241. For a description of the transaction, see id. at 40–57.
242. News Corp. Form 6-K, supra note 239, at app. E-1.
243. The News Corp. Ltd., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 1 (Sept. 1, 2005).
244. News Corp. Form 6-K, supra note 239, at 30.
245. OECD Tax Database, supra note 107.
246. News Corp. Form 6-K, supra note 239, at E-121.
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the long-time Chairman, CEO, and largest shareholder of News Corp.,
stated at the time that “[w]e undertook this move for one reason: to
create greater value for our shareholders.” 247 The expected benefit for
shareholders was to come from several factors such as:
[e]nhanced US-based demand for the company’s shares, over
time, resulting from an expanded active US shareholder base
and the expected inclusion in major US indices; Potential
narrowing of the trading discount of the non-voting shares
relative to the voting shares, further enhancing the relative value
of the non-voting shares; Improved access to a larger pool of
capital available in the US, which should provide greater
financial flexibility and improved pricing for capital raisings and
acquisition purposes; Full consolidation and control of [a
publishing business] . . . ; Reduced corporate complexity; and
[e]xternal reporting in a manner consistent with News
Corporation’s peer group in the US. 248
It thus seems that the move was financially-driven and not taxdriven. 249 Indeed, in the two decades preceding the inversion, News
Corp. aggressively expanded its U.S. operations. 250 For example, it
acquired 20th Century Fox in 1985, Fox TV Network in 1987, launched
the Fox News Channel in 1996, and completed the acquisition of
DirecTV in 2003. 251 Approximately seventy percent of the group’s
revenues, eighty percent of the profits, and eighty percent the long-lived
assets were located in the United States at the time of the inversion.252
The corporate operational headquarters was in New York, where it had
been located for twenty years by the time of the move. 253
The largest shareholder of News Corp. was the Murdoch family
that—through various holding entities—controlled 29.86% of the voting
power (this was expected to decrease to 29.47% after the completion of
the transaction). 254 Mr. Murdoch, although born in Australia, has lived in

247. THE NEWS CORP. LTD., ANNUAL REPORT 4 (2004) [hereinafter NEWS CORP. ANNUAL
REPORT].
248. News Corp. Form 6-K, supra note 239, at 2 (list formatting omitted).
249. Id. at 1 (“Mr. Murdoch said the proposal was designed to make News Corporation a more
attractive investment to shareholders and that he believes the proposal has potential benefits for
shareholders.”).
250. See id. at app. E-35.
251. Id.
252. Id. at E-3.
253. Id. at E-5.
254. Id. at 9.
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the U.S. since 1974 and became a U.S. citizen in 1985. 255 Moreover,
U.S. investors controlled the largest share of publicly-traded stock with
20.83% holding in the ordinary class of voting stock, and 34.28% of the
non-voting preferred stock. 256 News Corp.’s board was also U.S.dominated. According to the 2004 annual report, eleven board members
were U.S. nationals, four were Australians, one was British, and one was
Finnish.
Given the dominant U.S. flavor of News Corp. operations and
management at the time of the transaction, the expert opinion supporting
the transaction concluded that News Corp. was “already a United States
based company.” 257 A change in legal domicile simply followed News
Corp.’s business reality. 258
The transaction did not go without conflict. Australian investors—
who have held a significant stake in News Corp.—were concerned that
corporate governance would be affected to their disadvantage given the
difference between Australian and U.S. corporate and securities laws, as
well as the physical dislocation of governance mechanisms (such as that
the general meeting would no longer be held in Adelaide). 259 This
eventually resulted in legal battles and the offloading of shares by
Australian institutional investors.260 Some have speculated that the move
was indeed driven by controlling shareholders’ desire to take advantage
of governance mechanisms available under U.S. law, but not under
Australian law. 261
It is also interesting to note that from an investor-level-tax point of
view, the inversion might have been detrimental to Australian
shareholders, but beneficial to U.S. shareholders. Most jurisdictions in
the world, U.S. and Australia included, impose withholding tax on
dividend payments from domestic corporations to foreign

255. Simon Coppock, Murdoch, Keith Rupert, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE HISTORY OF
AMERICAN MANAGEMENT 393, 393 (Morgen Witzel ed., 2005).
256. News Corp. Form 6-K, supra note 239, at app. E-86.
257. Id. at E-5.
258. Id. at E-4 (“[A] change of domicile is probably inevitable at some point if the shareholder
base becomes increasingly dominated by United States investors. Deferring this event will not make
the index and transition issues go away.”).
259. For a detailed discussion of shareholders’ disputes the ensued, see Jennifer G. Hill,
Subverting Shareholder Rights: Lessons from News Corp.’s Migration to Delaware, 63 VAND. L.
REV. 1 (2010).
260. Richard Siklos, News Corp. Sued over Poison Pill Move, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2005, at C3.
261. News Corp. Form 6-K, supra note 239, at 29–40 (discussing comparative differences in
respect of the poison pill mechanism adopted by News Corp. following the inversion).
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shareholders. 262 This meant that prior to the inversion, U.S. shareholders
(including the Murdoch family), but not Australian shareholders, were
subject to dividend withholding tax in Australia on any dividend paid by
Old News Corp. (under the U.S.-Australia tax treaty, the rate is five
percent to shareholders who hold ten percent or more of the voting
power, and fifteen percent to all others). 263 After the inversion, U.S.
shareholders (including the Murdoch family) were not subject to
dividend withholding tax on any dividend paid by New News Corp.,
while Australian shareholders were.
However, notwithstanding corporate governance and other agency
issues, News Corp. went to a great length to explain that its Australian
operations would not be affected by the move. New News Corp.’s
registration statement (made in connection with New News Corp.’s
stock offering) suggested that “the Directors of News Corporation do not
intend to make (a) any material change to the continuation of the
business of News Corporation; (b) any major changes to the business of
News Corporation, including redeploying of fixed assets; or (c) any
change to the future employment of the present employees of News
Corporation.” 264 Mr. Murdoch, in his annual letter to shareholders,
added that notwithstanding the inversion plan, “[f]or more than 80 years,
the Company has proudly called Australia its home. It is where the
Company was founded, nurtured, and from where we get our
entrepreneurial spirit. Australia is our spiritual home, and will always
remain so.” 265 He noted that “[t]he move will have no discernible impact
on our operations, in Australia or elsewhere. We will remain a proud and
vital part of the Australian media landscape with a listing on the
262. AULT & ARNOLD, supra note 151, at 510 (“All of the systems under consideration here
[including United States and Australia] impose gross based withholding tax on certain categories of
income.”). For United States withholding, see id. at 510. For Australian withholding, see id. at 513.
It should be noted however, that shareholders in worldwide systems would generally be entitled to
receive credit for foreign tax paid. Difference in the national identity may still be relevant for the
after-tax outcome of shareholders, however, if under national law the entitlement for foreign tax
credits is unavailable (for example, as a result of tax exempt status). See, e.g., Omri Marian,
Reconciling Tax Law and Securities Regulations, 48 MICH. J. L. REFORM 1, 22–28 (2014)
(providing numerical examples showing how the interaction of tax-exempt status and foreign tax
credits laws may result in different after-tax outcome to similarly situated investors).
263. The Convention Between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of Australia for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal
Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, U.S.-Austl., art. 10, May 14, 1953, 4 U.S.T. 2274.
264. News Corp. Form 6-K, supra note 239, at 94; see also id. at E-1 (“There will be no material
change to the operations, management or strategy of News Corporation. The directors of News
Corporation following the 2004 annual general meeting will all become directors of News Corp
US.”).
265. NEWS CORP. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 247, at 4.
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Australian Stock Exchange—now and for generations to come.” 266
Indeed, based on public disclosures, it seems that News Corp. made
good on its promise not to change its Australian operations. In the years
following the inversion Australian revenues and assets slightly increased
(consistent with expansion of the worldwide activity of News Corp.) and
maintained (even slightly increased) their relative share in global
operations. Australia accounted for eleven percent of the group’s longlived assets in both 2005 and 2006, and for fifteen percent of the
revenues in both years (similar to pre-inversion figures). 267 The national
composition of the board also changed little. In both 2005 and 2006 the
board comprised ten American members, three Australian (compared
with four prior to the inversion), and one British. One Spaniard was
appointed in 2006.
To summarize, News Corp.’s inversion resulted in little change to
Australian operations, both in terms of strategic management and in
terms of local operations. Significant economic attributes had been built
up in the U.S. over a period of two decades preceding the inversion. To
the extent any meaningful dislocations took place in Australia, they had
happened long before the inversion and were driven by non-tax
considerations. Tax-residence seems to have followed management and
business relocation in this case and not the other way around as
empirical literature suggests. 268 Moreover, tax-residence followed
business considerations even though the change in tax-residence was not
expected to generate any corporate-level tax benefit (and might have
even been detrimental).
Table 5 summarizes some of News Corp.’s geographical data before
and after the inversion.

266. Id. at 4–5.
267. For segment information, see News Corp. Form 6-K, supra note 239, at E-40; The News
Corp. Ltd., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 138 (Aug. 23, 2006).
268. See discussion supra Part II.A.
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Table 5 – Summary of News Corp.’s activity by geographical segment before and after the
inversion
2003

2004 (Inversion

2005 (Inversion)

announced)

completed)

2006

Board
Members’
Nationality
American

7

8

8

8

Australian

3

4

3

3

British/American

4

3

2

2

British

1

1

1

1

Finish

1

1

0

0

Spanish

0

0

0

1

Total

16

17

14

15

Not reported

30,683 (82%)

33,764 (81%)

35,097 (81%)

Not reported

3,407 (9%)

3,381 (8%)

3,582 (8%)

Not reported

3,254 (9%)

4,768 (11%)

4,847 (11%)

Not reported

37,344 (100%)

41,913 (100%)

Long-Lived
Assets ($
million)
United States and
Canada
Europe
Australia

and

other
Total

43,526
(100%)

Gross Revenues
($ million)
United States and

11,150 (64%)

12,022 (58%)

12,884 (54%)

14,102 (56%)

Europe

3,846 (22%)

6,015 (29%)

7,511 (31%)

7,552 (30%)

Australia and

2,384 (14%)

2,765 (13%)

3,464 (15%)

3,673 (15%)

17,380 (100%)

20,802 (100%)

23,859 (100%)

Canada

other
Total

25,327
(100%)
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Tim Hortons Inc. 2009 Move from the U.S. to Canada

Tim Hortons is a fast-food chain known mostly for its coffee and
doughnuts. It was founded in 1964 in Hamilton, Canada.269 It operated
almost exclusively in Canada until 1995, when it was acquired by the
U.S.-based Wendy’s corporation. 270 In 2006, Tim Hortons went public
as a dual listed company, listing its stock on both the NYSE and the
Toronto Stock Exchange. 271 At the time, Wendy’s sold 17.25% of the
stock to the public. 272 The remaining stock was distributed to
shareholders later in 2006, and Tim Hortons has been a widely held
company ever since. 273
The initial public offering (IPO) was structured as a spinoff of Tim
Hortons out of Wendy’s. The spun-off public entity was a Delawareincorporated entity. 274 Therefore, the publicly traded entity was a U.S.
corporation for tax purposes. It remained so until the 2009 inversion
discussed below. Notwithstanding its U.S.-based IPO structure, Tim
Hortons’ management remained in Canada. 275 After the IPO, Tim
Hortons also continued to earn substantially all of its operating income
from Canada. 276
On June 29, 2009, Tim Hortons (“Old THI”) announced a
reorganization plan, under which the publicly traded entity would
become a Canadian corporation for tax purposes.277 Under the plan, Old
THI merged with a newly formed Canadian subsidiary (“New THI”),

269. The Story of Tim Hortons, TIM HORTONS, http://www.timhortons.com/us/en/about/the-storyof-tim-hortons.php (last visited Jan. 16, 2015).
270. Id.
271. Tim Hortons Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 99 (Feb. 26, 2009) [hereinafter Tim Hortons
2008 10-K] (“On March 29, 2006, the Company completed its initial public offering (‘IPO’).”).
272. Id. (“[O]f 33.35 million shares of common stock, representing 17.25% of the common stock
outstanding. The remaining 82.75% continued to be held by Wendy’s. On September 29, 2006,
Wendy’s disposed of its remaining 82.75% interest in the Company, by a special pro-rated dividend
distribution of the Company’s stock to Wendy’s shareholders of record on September 15, 2006, and,
as a result, since September 30, 2006, the Company’s shares have been widely held.”).
273. Id.
274. For a description of the IPO structure, see Tim Hortons Inc., Registration Statement (Form
S-1) 45–46 (Mar. 21, 2006) [hereinafter Tim Hortons S-1].
275. According to the IPO registration statement, the principal executive offices remained in
Oakville, Canada. See id. at 4.
276. According to its 2007 annual report, 91.9% of the 2007 revenues were produced in Canada.
Tim Hortons Inc., 2007 Annual Report (Form 10-K) 121 (Feb. 26. 2008).
277. Press Release, Tim Hortons Inc., Registration Statement Filed for Proposed Reorganization
of Tim Hortons as a Canadian Public Company (Jun. 29, 2009) [hereinafter Tim Hortons Press
Release].
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and the shares of Old THI were converted to shares of New THI. 278 New
THI maintained its dual listing in Canada and the United States.
Tax savings was one of the stated reasons for the inversion.279 As a
Canadian company, Tim Hortons expected to reduce its effective tax
rates by four percent, six percent, and eight percent for years 2010, 2011,
and 2012 respectively. 280 The tax benefit was expected at least in part
due to reduction in Canadian corporate tax rates. 281 However, tax did not
play an exclusive role in the consideration to invert.
As noted above, following the 2006 IPO, the corporate management
as well as most of the operational activity remained in Canada. The
registration statement for the 2009 inversion offering recognized such
reality, noting that “[c]urrently, our U.S. public company parent . . . is a
holding company that conducts no business and has no material
assets . . . We currently derive approximately 90% of our revenue from
our Canadian operations.” 282
The board concluded that “[t]he existence of a non-operating parent
holding company incorporated in a country where we conduct only a
small portion of our business creates inefficient administrative
complexities unrelated to our business operations.” 283 Along the same
lines, the company suggested that “organizing under a Canadian parent
is expected to permit us to expand in Canada and internationally.” 284
Also, since Tim Hortons generated most of its cash flow from Canadian
operations, 285 it was expected that the post-inversion structure would
“reduce exposure to volatility in reported earnings and other items by
substantially lowering exposure to foreign exchange rate
fluctuations.” 286 The board even noted that the pre-inversion U.S.
structure, coupled with the dominant Canadian flavor of Old THI,
caused confusion among “lenders, suppliers, landlords and local
governmental agencies.” 287 Matching the legal domicile with the
operational reality has therefore been pitched as an expected benefit of
278. Id.
279. Tim Hortons Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-4/A) 26 (Aug. 12, 2009) [hereinafter Tim
Hortons S-4/A].
280. Id. at 19.
281. Tim Hortons Press Release, supra note 277.
282. Tim Hortons S-4/A, supra note 279, at 26 (emphasis added).
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 27.
286. Id.
287. Id.
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the inversion.
This story is well supported by Old THI’s corporate filings for 2008
(the year preceding the inversion). At the time, the entire executive team
of Old THI was composed of Canadian nationals. Similarly, the board of
directors was overwhelmingly controlled by Canadians, with ten
Canadian board members and only two Americans. Also at the end of
2008, Old THI had 2917 restaurants in Canada, compared with 520 in
the U.S. 288 Old THI occupied 546,410 square feet of manufacturing and
distribution facilities in Canada, compared with about 45,500 square feet
in the United States. 289 Canada accounted for sixty-six percent of Old
THI’s long-lived assets and seventy-nine percent of the gross revenues,
compared with twenty-seven percent and six percent in the U.S.,
respectively. 290
Under such circumstances, Old THI’s board was not concerned with
any possible penalties imposed by the U.S. anti-inversion rule of Section
7874. Old THI easily met the “substantial business activity” exception,
as most of its activities were conducted in Canada, the jurisdiction to
which it inverted. 291 Section 7874 did not apply to the transaction. 292
A review of New THI annual reports in the years following the
inversion indicates that no meaningful dislocations can be observed in
the United States. For example, there has been little change in the
composition of the executive team. In 2009, one Canadian executive left.
One Canadian and one American were appointed. The executive team
remained the same in 2010. The only change observed in the Board of
Directors during the 2008–2010 period was the departure of one
American board member.
U.S. operations were also not negatively affected. In fact, New THI
opened additional restaurants in the United States. The chain increased
its U.S. presence from 520 restaurants before the inversion to 563 and
602 restaurants in 2009 and 2010 respectively. 293 New THI
manufacturing and distribution facilities in the United States remained
the same throughout the tested period. 294 U.S. revenues remained largely
unchanged, with a slight increase observed in 2009 (but a decrease to the
288. TIM HORTONS, ANNUAL REPORT 37 (2008); id. at 36.
289. Id. at 37
290. TIM HORTONS, ANNUAL REPORT 37 (2009). The percentage figures take into account nonreportable segments.
291. Tim Hortons S-4/A, supra note 279, at 34.
292. Id. at 34.
293. Tim Hortons Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 62 (Feb. 22, 2011).
294. Id. at 40.
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pre-inversion level in 2010). 295 While some decline can be observed in
the value of the net U.S. long-lived assets (from $402,839,000 in 2008 to
$324,600,000 in 2010), this decline has not been matched with a decline
in revenues. A corresponding increase in assets can be observed in
“corporate assets,” which refers to assets that support the corporation as
a whole (i.e., assets the benefits of which cannot be associated with an
identified geographical segment). 296
To summarize, Tim Hortons’ inversion was a virtual “naked”
inversion. In fact, the very suggestion that Tim Hortons’ 2009 inversion
is an “expatriation” of a corporation away from the United States is a
misnomer. 297 The transaction is much better described as repatriation to
Canada. Tim Hortons was simply “returning to its origins.” 298 Given that
Tim Hortons has always retained its Canadian identity, one might
wonder, why did it move to the U.S. in the first place (in 2006), and why
did it wait until 2009 to return to its true home?
The 2006 IPO was probably driven by the interests of THI’s U.S.
owner, Wendy’s, which at the time held the entire capital stock of THI.
This can explain the choice to go public as a U.S. entity. Under such
circumstances, there was little reason to expect that the 2009 inversion
would result in a loss of important economic attributes in the United
States. Such attributes were always located in Canada, and were never
the United States’ to lose.
THI may have chosen 2009 as the year for repatriation for two
reasons. First, as stated in the press release, Canada was in the process of
gradually reducing its federal corporate income tax rates, from twentytwo percent in 2007 to fifteen percent by 2012. In 2008, the rate was
19.5% and was expected to be reduced to eighteen percent by 2010, the
year in which New THI expected to start reaping the tax benefit. 299 It
seems odd, however, that a rate reduction of 1.5% made the difference in
the decision to invert. Even before Canada’s gradual rate reduction, the
maximum Canadian rate of twenty-two percent was substantially lower
than the U.S. rate of thirty-five percent.

295. Segment reporting information can be found at id. at 165–69.
296. Id. at 100.
297. See, e.g., Chris Edwards, Moving to Canada for Lower Taxes, CATO INST. BLOG (Jul. 6,
2009, 11:52 AM), http://www.cato.org/blog/moving-canada-lower-taxes (suggesting that “Tim
Hortons (essentially Canada’s Starbucks) is packing up its U.S. headquarters and moving to
Ontario,” and that such move “might affect where higher-wage corporate headquarters jobs are
located in the long run”).
298. MARPLES & GRAVELLE, supra note 14, at 7.
299. Tim Hortons Press Release, supra note 277.
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A second aspect for the decision to invert in 2009 is briefly noted in
the registration statement. Old THI, the public company that spun off
from Wendy’s, entered into certain tax sharing agreements with its
parent as part of the IPO. 300 Tax sharing agreements generally prevent a
corporation from taking any actions that change the ownership structure
within an affiliated group. 301 Also, the U.S. tax code restricts certain
dispositions in spun-off companies’ stock from taking place too close in
time after the spinoff. 302 These issues were explicitly noted in the
registration statement as restrictions that prevented earlier changes to the
corporate structure. 303 One might wonder what would have happened if
it were not for the contractual obligations and the time limits embedded
in the U.S. Code.
Table 6 summarizes some of Tim Hortons’ geographical data before
and after the inversion.
Table 6 – Summary of Tim Hortons activity by geographical segment before and after the
inversion
2008

2009 (Inversion

2010

announced and
completed)
Executives’
Nationality
Canadian 304

9

9

9

American

0

1

1

Total

9

10

10

Board Members’
Nationality 305

300. Tim Hortons S-1, supra note 274, at 117–18.
301. Tim Hortons S-4/A, supra note 279, at 26 (“As a result of a tax sharing agreement that we
entered into with Wendy’s at the time of our IPO, and of time constraints under U.S. tax rules
relating to our spinoff from Wendy’s, our ability to engage in certain acquisitions, reorganizations
and other transactions was limited for a period of time. These restrictions have now expired.”). For a
discussion of reasons for such restrictions, see Stanley Barsky, Tips on Drafting Tax Sharing
Agreements, 144 TAX NOTES 180 (2014).
302. For a discussion of such restrictions, see Herbert N. Beller & Lori E. Harwell, After the
Spin: Preserving Tax-Free Treatment Under Section 355, 92 TAX NOTES 1587 (2001).
303. See Tim Hortons S-4/A, supra note 279, at 26.
304. This includes one executive with a dual Canadian/British citizenship.
305. The nationality of most of Tim Hortons’ executives is based on inferences such as the
executives’ education and other managerial positions. Most are not included in biographical
databases that provide citizenship data.
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Canadian

10

10

59

10

American

2

2

1

Total

12

12

11

2,917

3,015

3,148

U.S.

520

563

602

Ireland

247

206

194

UK

46

85

81

Afghanistan

1

1

1

3,731

3,870

4,026

622,410

757,490

≈ 45,500

≈ 45,500

1,290,219 (62%)

1,373,325 (66%)

1,686,209 (68%)

567,557 (27%)

478,395 (23%)

424,089 (17%)

213,407 (10%)

226,470 (11%)

37,868 (2%)

26,511 (1%)

16,101 (1%)

333,350 (13%)

2,097,694 (100%)

2,094,291 (100%)

2,481,516 (100%)

Canada

913,823 (61%)

967,879 (65%)

1,012,322 (74%)

U.S.

402,839 (27%)

356,560 (24%)

324,600 (24%)

Variable Interests

163,376 (11%)

156,712 (10%)

25,252 (2%)

13,647 (1%)

12,881 (1%)

11,496 (1%)

1,493,685 (100%)

1,494,032 (100%)

1,373,670 (100%)

Restaurants
Canada

Total
Properties (Sq.
Ft.)
Canada

546,410
≈ 45,500

U.S.

306

Gross Assets ($
thousands)
Canada
U.S.
Variable
Interests 307
Corporate

308

Total
Long Lived
Assets
(net, $ thousands)

Corporate
Total

306. This includes three assets that are reported as having a size of greater than 2500 square feet.
For purposes of the calculation, it is assumed that each asset has a size of 2500 square feet.
307. Variable interests include consolidation of financial results in “variable interest entities”
which include entities in which a holder holds controlling interest that is not based on majority of
voting rights.
308. Corporate assets include assets that benefit the groups as a whole, rather than an identified
geographical segment.
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Revenues
($ thousands)
1,750,399 (79%)

Canada

1,914,210 (78%)

2,114,419 (83%)

U.S.

122,679 (6%)

140,491 (6%)

123,116 (5%)

Variable Interests

356,095 (16%)

384,152 (16%)

298,960 (12%)

2,229,173 (100%)

2,438,853 (100%)

2,536,495 (100%)

Total

IV.

DISCUSSION: PATTERNS OF INVERSIONS AND HOME
COUNTRY DISLOCATIONS

A.

Summary of Findings

Table 7 summarizes each of the case studies discussed. It outlines
whether tax-saving was a factor driving the inversion, as well as the
business affiliation of each inverting corporation to the target
jurisdiction. The two right-most columns summarize what types of
meaningful dislocations can be observed in the home jurisdiction
following the inversion.
Table 7 – Summary of observed dislocations in the home jurisdictions

Inverting
corporation

Was entitylevel tax
saving a
driving
factor?

Pre-inversion interests in
target jurisdiction

Management
relocation

Can other homejurisdiction
dislocations be
observed?

Shire
Pharmaceuticals

Yes

Insignificant

No; Virtual

No

Wolseley PLC

Yes

Insignificant

No; Virtual

Yes, operational,
but not to target
jurisdiction;
Unclear if
attributable to
inversion

Nobel Biocare

Yes

Significant: Board members,
CEO nationality; Investor
base; Major local market

Yes; partial to
full

No

News
Corporation

No

Significant: Board members’
nationality; Functional HQ;
Controlling shareholders
nationality; Investor base;
Largest market of operations

Management
already located
in target
jurisdiction

Yes, corporate
governance
functions; direct
result of the
inversion

Tim Hortons

Yes

Significant: Board members
and executives nationality;
Functional HQ; Largest
market of operations

Management
already located
in target
jurisdiction

No; Operational
activities already
located in target
jurisdiction
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The first obvious outcome from an analysis of the case studies is that
the type and scope of meaningful dislocations varies tremendously.
Whether an inversion is associated with the dislocation of meaningful
functions in the home jurisdiction is a highly contextualized question.
Therefore, a blanket policy statement according to which inversions
result in the loss of positive attributes cannot stand. This further supports
the need for an observation-based theory that may explain the
relationship between inversions and meaningful dislocations. Such
theory can suggest propositions for future empirical research, which in
turn will provide useful guidance for tax-writers. 309
A second interesting observation is that in all cases in which
meaningful headquarters dislocations occurred, the inverting corporation
already had significant business affiliation with the target jurisdiction. It
is thus plausible to theorize that meaningful dislocations of management
attributes are to be expected where non-tax considerations, such as the
draw of the target jurisdiction’s financial markets, investor base, or
personal affiliation of management are present. 310
This conclusion does not stand to negate the inverse, that is, that no
dislocations are expected where only tax considerations are present.
However, it is plausible to argue that business attributes in the home
jurisdiction can serve as friction factors that deter meaningful
dislocations. If locational tax rules are attached to such factors,
inversions that are motivated solely by tax reasons may be prevented.
B.

Grounded Constructs of Home Country Effects of Inversions

Various patterns of management relocations can be identified in the
case studies that warrant further research. Section 1 discusses the
chronology of inversions and meaningful dislocations. As explained, it is
not at all clear from the case studies that meaningful dislocations
chronologically follow inversions. It is sometimes observed that
meaningful dislocations precede inversions. This suggests the possibility
that in some cases inversions may be driven by meaningful dislocation,
and not the other way around,
Section 2 discusses the spectrum of headquarters dislocations, and
demonstrates that the degree of meaningful dislocations, as well as the
types of dislocated corporate functions, is different in each case. It
therefore seems that the types of meaningful dislocations are context309. For a discussion of propositions for future research, see discussion infra Part IV.B.
310. Such a conclusion is consistent with the findings of Birkinshaw et al., supra note 8. See also
supra notes 90–98 and accompanying text.
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dependent.
Section 3 discusses dislocations against the background of the taxresidence tests in the home jurisdiction. It shows that a formal taxresidence test, such as POI, is not a panacea against meaningful
dislocations, and that a Real Seat test does not necessarily explain
meaningful reallocations. This is contrary to the suggested policy
implications of empirical inversions literature.
Section 4 demonstrates the importance of reputation as well as
conflicts of interests in the context of inversions transactions. This
section suggests the possibility that such factors may play a role in an
inverted MNC’s decision on whether to dislocate significant attributes.
The dislocations patterns are discussed below, and are summarized in
Table 8.
Table 8 – Summary of dislocation patterns in inversions
Chronology of
dislocations

Spectrum and type
of dislocations

Pattern of taxresidence
dislocation

Stakeholders’
interests in respect
of meaningful
dislocations

No dislocation
observed

Legal relocation;
no financial
relocation; virtual
management
relocation; no
operational
relocation

Virtual CMC
relocation

Interests probably
aligned for virtual
relocation

Wolseley PLC

No management
dislocation;
concurrent
operational
dislocation, but not
to target
jurisdiction

Legal relocation;
no financial
relocation; virtual
management
relocation; some
operational
relocation, but not
to target
jurisdiction

Virtual CMC
relocation

Interests probably
aligned for virtual
relocation;
Interests probably
not aligned for
operational
relocation

Nobel Biocare

Concurrent
management
dislocation with
inversion

Legal, financial
and management
relocation; no
operational
relocation

Substantive POI
relocation

Interests probably
aligned for
management
relocation and for
operational nonrelocation

All dislocations
prior to inversion

Legal, financial,
management and
operational
relocation

Substantive CMC
relocation

Conflicts of
interest for legal
relocation; interests
probably aligned
for non-relocation
of operational
activities

No dislocation
observed

Legal

Virtual POI
relocation

Interests probably
aligned for virtual
relocation

Inverting
corporation

Shire
Pharmaceuticals

News Corporation

Tim Hortons
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Chronology of Inversions and Dislocations

The case studies suggest that when an inversion is associated with
meaningful management relocation, it is not necessarily the case that
management relocation chronologically follows the inversion. Rather,
management relocation can be observed in cases where tax relocation
happens after significant connections of the management to the target
jurisdiction had already been established. This suggests that locational
tax rules that are attached to management attributes (such as determining
residence based on CMC) would not prevent inversions where there are
business justifications for the restructuring (nor should it). Two patterns
can be observed:
Inversion Follows Meaningful Management Relocation. Under such
a pattern, inversion is the last step in a substantive move of management
and business operations to another jurisdiction. Over a period of time, an
MNC may develop a foreign market that completely outgrows the
MNC’s historical home market. When the MNC is no longer
substantively located in its historic jurisdiction, but rather in the new
market, the inversion follows the business reality. For example, by the
time News Corp. inverted from Australia to the U.S., it was already, in
substance, an American corporation.
Tim Hortons is another interesting example in this context, but one
that is somewhat different than News Corp.’s. In that case the inversion
followed management (which was located in Canada), but the
management was never in the U.S. to begin with. In fact, Tim Hortons’
first move to the U.S. in 2006 is an example of an inversion that was not
followed by management dislocation, while the 2009 repatriation is an
example of a “return to origins” type inversion.
Inversion Complements Meaningful Management Relocation.
Under such a pattern, at the time of the inversion, management already
has strong business or personal affiliation with the target jurisdiction.
For example, Nobel’s management move to Switzerland followed the
appointment of a Swiss CEO. Three other board members were also
Swiss before the inversion. Switzerland was an important market for
Nobel, so there were both personal and business reasons to transfer the
headquarters from Sweden to Switzerland. Tax savings supported such a
move, and may have been the “final straw” necessary to initiate the
inversion. 311 It is possible that a more competitive tax environment in
Sweden would have prevented the move. However, it does not seem that

311. See discussion supra Part III.B.3.
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tax considerations alone would have facilitated an actual move of the
management.
Other case studies not discussed herein show similar patterns. For
example, when ENSCO inverted from the U.S. to the UK in 2009, it
announced that “most of [its] senior executive officers and other key
decision makers will move to England.” 312 However, at the time,
ENSCO already had significant operations in the UK 313
Theoretically speaking, a third pattern could occur, as suggested by
empirical literature on inversions:
Inversion precedes meaningful management relocation. Under such
a pattern management move would follow an inversion, even though the
corporation had no previous affiliation with the target jurisdiction. This
pattern has not been observed in the case studies explored, but it may
still be possible.
2.

Spectrum and Types of Headquarters Dislocations

The case studies lend support to the decentralized view of MNCs’
headquarters. The dislocation of meaningful attributes cannot be
described as a binary variable. It is better placed on a spectrum,
consistent with studies in organizational science. Different functions
may dislocate, and each to a different degree.
For such purposes, Desai’s division of MNCs’ headquarters to
“legal,” “financial,” and “managerial” is helpful in describing observed
patterns of functional dislocations. 314 The crucial question for the
purpose of this study is whether it can be observed that a relocation of a
firm’s tax home (part of the “legal home”) is also associated with the
relocation of the firm’s financial home and managerial talent. This may
help to articulate the types of attributes that may be lost as a result of
tax-relocation. The loss of different attributes may dictate different
policy considerations. For example, whether corporate relocations are
associated with the loss of management jobs, or R&D activities, the
effect on the local economy might be different. Depending on the type of
activities governments wish to encourage within their territories, they
may adopt different policies that specifically target management jobs
(for example, granting tax incentives to managers to relocate to the

312. See ENSCO Int’l Inc., Proxy Statement (Form S-4) 3 (Nov. 20, 2009).
313. According to ENSCO’s annual report for 2009, the UK was the largest single-jurisdiction
segment in terms of revenues, and accounted for about ten percent for the long-lived assets of
worldwide operations. See ENSCO INT’L INC., ANNUAL REPORT 101 (2009).
314. See supra notes 81–87 and accompanying text.
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jurisdiction) or R&D activity (for example, by granting subsidies to the
performance of such activities within the jurisdiction).
Management Relocations. Relocation of managerial talent results in
the loss of meaningful attributes, but does not seem to be driven (at least
not primarily) by tax relocation. The movement of management talent is
a matter of degree. It can be complete, partial, or virtual. 315 Inversions
driven solely by tax considerations seem to be associated with virtual
management relocations (Shire; Wolseley). Full or partial management
relocations happen in the context of inversions that are supported, at
least in part, by non-tax considerations (Nobel; News Corp.).
Financial Relocations. Financial relocations may bring about a
change to governance mechanisms, which can be viewed as a
meaningful attribute, the loss of which is detrimental. Indeed, Australian
stakeholders in News Corp. who viewed the inversion as detrimental to
the company’s corporate governance mechanisms fought to prevent the
inversion. 316 Changes in governance seem to be associated with tax
relocation in cases where non-tax considerations are also involved
(Nobel; News Corp.). Where an inversion is driven solely by tax
considerations, no changes in governance mechanisms can be observed
(Wolseley; Shire).
Tax/Legal Relocation. Tax relocation, in and of itself, results in the
loss of the corporate tax base. The case studies suggest that tax
relocation may be associated with financial and management relocations
(Nobel; News Corp.), but does not necessarily explain financial and
management relocations. Also, management home seems more likely to
attract the legal home than the legal home is likely to attract
management. For example, contractual and tax obligations forced Tim
Hortons’ management to maintain the legal home separate from the
management home. Once this obstruction had been removed, the legal
home moved to the place of the managerial home (and not the other way
around).
3.

Tax Residence and Meaningful Headquarters Dislocations

One of the main arguments against the adoption of a Real Seat test for
corporate tax-residence is that it will induce meaningful management
relocations. It is therefore preferable to have a POI test in place, as it is
not expected to distort locational decisions in an economically
meaningful manner. The case studies lend little support to such
315. See supra notes 99–101 and accompanying text.
316. See supra note 259 and accompanying text.
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argument, and contradictory patterns can be observed.
Meaningful Relocation from a POI Jurisdiction. The adoption of a
POI test for corporate residence is not an assurance against the
dislocation of meaningful management attributes. Business
considerations seem to dictate meaningful moves, even if tax
considerations suggest otherwise (meaning, when tax relocation can be
achieved without a management move). Nobel is an example of such an
inversion. In that case, meaningful dislocations can be observed even
though the home jurisdiction applied a POI test (Sweden), and the target
jurisdiction applied a Real Seat test (Switzerland). 317 Theoretically, all
that Nobel had to do in order to lose its tax-residence in Sweden was to
incorporate elsewhere. Nonetheless, a meaningful management move
took place. Similarly, Tim Hortons’ management had always remained
in Canada, while the place of incorporation changed in 2006 to the
United States, only to return back to Canada in 2009.
Virtual Relocation from a POI Jurisdiction. When the home
jurisdiction is a POI jurisdiction, all that an MNC has to do in order to
“lose” its tax residence is to achieve foreign incorporation. If only tax
considerations are involved, there is no reason to expect further
dislocation of economic attributes. This has been the case during the first
wave of corporate inversions in the U.S. 318
In the same vein, Tim Hortons’ case study is an interesting example
of a corporation that had little presence in the U.S., and therefore little
reason to stay in the U.S. Tim Hortons’ management was already located
in Canada. It seems that the inversion would have happened even if the
United States had adopted a Real Seat corporate-residence test.
Virtual Relocation from a CMC Jurisdiction. The case studies also
suggest that meaningful attributes must not necessarily be dislocated
when an MNC inverts away from a CMC jurisdiction. In both the cases
of Wolseley and Shire, management relocations were virtual,
notwithstanding the fact that the UK decides the residence of
corporations based on a CMC test.
This can be explained, however, by suggesting that the CMC test
applied in the UK is not truly a substantive test. The ability to relocate
without dislocating real management attributes suggests that the CMC
test used in the UK is nothing more than a formal residence test (similar
317. For a similar discussion in the context of ENSCO, see supra notes 312–313 and
accompanying text.
318. MARPLES & GRAVELLE, supra note 14, at 1 (“These corporate inversions apparently
involved few, if any, shifts in actual economic activity from the United States abroad, at least in the
near term.”).
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to POI) in disguise. In turn, this implies that corporations virtually
inverted from the UK simply because—in the absence of frictions—they
could do so at minimal cost (by having board meetings conducted
outside the UK).
Meaningful Relocations from a CMC Jurisdiction. One case study
suggests that meaningful relocations from a CMC jurisdiction may be
associated with an inversion (News Corp.). However, in that case it is
clear that the meaningful dislocations happened long before the
inversion, and were not caused by the inversion.
Interestingly, one recent study suggests that inversions from European
CMC jurisdictions are made from the UK to a much greater extent than
from other jurisdictions. 319 No “wave” of cross-border inversions can be
observed from CMC jurisdictions such as Germany, France, and other
jurisdictions known for high corporate tax rates. France decides the
place of corporate residence based on the corporate “effective seat”
which is defined as “the place where bodies of management,
administration and control are located.” 320 French courts have
consistently refused to recognize the “foreign” tax status of firms that
had no substantive attributes in the foreign jurisdiction, and all of the
significant attributes located in France. 321 Similarly, in Germany, the
place of management refers to “the place of day-to-day business
management of the company rather than to the site of its strategic
direction.” 322 To make such substantive determination, German courts
consider, among others things, the identity of the executives involved,
their performed management functions, and the availability (or lack
thereof) of permanent management facilities. 323 Simply conducting
board meetings elsewhere would not suffice if an MNC sought to give
up its German tax-status.
It is therefore plausible that inversions out of the UK are common
since UK MNCs can invert out of the UK with no need to incur
319. See Laamanen, Simula & Torstila, supra note 3, at 197. Their descriptive statistics report
that during the tested period, the net change in UK headquarter firms (i.e., MNCs inverting from the
UK minus MNCs inverting to the UK) has been -14. For comparison, the second most negative
change had been that of the Netherlands, with -3. Germany had a net loss of only -1, while France
had a net gain of 2.
320. Nicolas de Boynes, France, in RESIDENCE OF COMPANIES UNDER TAX TREATIES AND EC
LAW 441, 450 (Guglielmo Maisto ed., 2009).
321. Id. at 450–52.
322. Joachim Englisch, Germany, in RESIDENCE OF COMPANIES UNDER TAX TREATIES AND EC
LAW 461, 487–88 (Guglielmo Maisto ed., 2009).
323. See id. at 489–95 (discussing German courts’ adjudication on the place of effective
management).
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significant costs by dislocating meaningful attributes. On the other hand,
when tax-residence is truly determined based on substantive factors, it is
plausible to hypothesize that the cost of the dislocations required to
achieve a shift of tax residence operates as a deterrent for inversions. An
interesting example in this context is Tim Hortons’ inversion, the timing
of which had apparently been affected by contractual arrangements and
time limits embedded in the U.S. tax code. These costs were apparently
successful in deterring an earlier inversion.
4.

Conflicts of Interests, Reputation and Meaningful Dislocations

Another pattern emerging from the case studies concerns the
important role of conflicts of interests arising from an inversion, and
corporate handling of such conflicts. Where potentially affected
parties—such as managers, investors, customers and employees—face
different inversion-related outcomes, agency issues may dictate
particular results.
Conflict of interest emerges as a relevant cost factor that may prevent
meaningful dislocations. For example, if an inversion can be achieved
without dislocations of management attributes, the interests of
shareholders and managers are aligned, as both groups wish to see the
effective rate of corporate tax decrease. If, however, managers have to
actually move in order to achieve an inversion, their interests are no
longer aligned with those of shareholders (assuming managers do not
want to move). Managers who wish to maintain their place of residence
may resist an inversion.
Conversely, it may be the case that shareholders oppose the inversion.
For example, if the restructuring itself is a taxable stock-for-stock
exchange (meaning, a cashless yet taxable transaction), shareholders
may be adversely affected. In such a case, shareholders may discount the
value of future corporate-level tax savings in the face of current
shareholder-level tax liability that is not accompanied by cash
distribution to satisfy the tax liability. 324
In addition, in all cases explored, the inverting corporations addressed
reputational issues that may arise from conflicts of interest, usually in
the press release announcing the inversion.325 MNCs take great care to
appease the minds of potentially affected parties. It therefore seems that
inversion consequences that are viewed negatively by interested parties
324. For a discussion of such considerations, see Jason Zweig, How to Owe Capital-Gains Taxes
Without Even Trying, WALL ST. J., Jan. 19, 2013, at B1.
325. See supra notes 143–144; 177–179; 210–212; 238–240 and accompanying text.
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may also serve as a deterrent for meaningful dislocations. This is
consistent with literature suggesting that the structure of legal
transactions has a branding effect and that negative branding may cause
transactions to fail. 326 In fact, recently, the U.S. retailer Walgreens
scrapped a plan to invert to the UK. One of the reasons behind this
decision was “the potential consumer backlash and political
ramifications, including the risk of losing a book of business.” 327
Inversion with Alignment of Interests Regarding Dislocation. When
the tax relocation is achieved with no conflicts of interests between
stakeholders, meaningful dislocation will occur if all interested parties
share a positive view of dislocation, and are less likely to occur if
interested parties share a negative view of dislocation. Within an
inverting corporation, different interests may align differently in respect
to the relocation of different functions.
For example, when Nobel moved to Switzerland, it seemed that the
tax savings and the actual move of management were in the interest of
both management members and the large Swiss investor base. Such
alignment of interests may explain the meaningful move of the board to
Switzerland. On the other hand, the interest of Swedish employees was,
obviously, to maintain their jobs in Sweden. Some board members as
well as the entire executive team were Swedish. At the same time, it did
not seem that any interested party demanded the dislocation of Swedish
operations. Such alignment of interests dictated that notwithstanding the
tax move, Swedish operations remained untouched.
When Shire and Wolseley inverted, both investors and managers were
interested in tax savings. This could have been achieved with no need
for the managers to move out of the UK and into the target jurisdictions.
This may have contributed to the virtual relocations observed in those
circumstances.
Inversion with Conflict of Interest on Dislocation. When interested
parties share different interests in the context of the inversion, conflicts
may arise. For example, in the context of News Corp.’s relocation,
Australian shareholders had different corporate-governance (and
possibly tax) interests than those of American shareholders and

326. See generally, Victor Fleischer, Brand New Deal: The Branding Effect of Corporate Deal
Structures, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1581 (2006) (describing how reputational issues may dictate the
presentation of transactions to investors, and how negative consumer reaction may contribute to the
prevention of inversions).
327. Maureen Farrell, Why Walgreen Chose Not to Invert, MONEYBEAT (Aug. 6, 2014, 1:48 PM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2014/08/06/why-walgreen-chose-not-to-invert/.
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controlling shareholders. 328 Such conflict presented an increased cost to
the dislocation of meaningful attributes, resulting from shareholders
litigation that ensued 329 (though it did not prevent the inversion).
C.

Some Policy Implications

The patterns of meaningful dislocations described herein are probably
not exhaustive and definitely not exclusive of each other. The case
studies should not be viewed as describing an empirical truth. This is an
inherent limitation of case studies. They may point to possible existing
constructs, but do not suggest that such constructs present the full
spectrum of reality. However, the case studies clearly show that the
relationship between tax-residence of corporations and the locations of
corporate economic attributes is, at best, unclear.
Each case study discussed combines different patterns, and different
combinations of such patterns may be suggestive of various types and
degrees of meaningful dislocations. It seems that some factors—such as
personal affiliation of executives, business interests in foreign
jurisdictions, and a large foreign investor base—may support meaningful
dislocations. Other factors—such as conflicts of interests, substantive
presence in the home jurisdiction, and reputational issues—may deter
dislocations. These latter factors can possibly present policymakers with
a non-tax toolbox for the prevention of negative effects of corporate
inversions.
One possible policy implication is, therefore, that frictions may play
an important role in the design of corporate tax residence tests. Tests
built on substantive attributes may prevent inversions and by doing so
maintain both the corporate tax base and the economic attributes in the
home jurisdiction. At the same time, substantive residence determination
does not prevent inversions that are executed for sound business reasons
(and hence accompanied by real dislocations), nor should it. However,
more research is necessary in order to identify the types of frictions best
suited for the design of tax-residence tests. The constructs identified
herein suggest several paths for such future research. Future research
may try to identify the variables that explain the timing of an inversion
and the extent of meaningful dislocation that happens following
inversions. In particular, it will be interesting to learn about the role of
frictions such as tax-residence constructs and conflicts of interests in this
328. See generally Hill, supra note 259, at 29–40 (explaining the difference in governance
mechanism (specifically, board ability to adopt “poison pills”) between the U.S. and Australia).
329. Siklos, supra note 260.
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context.
Another policy implication of the case studies, is that tax-residence of
a corporation matters primarily for tax-base calculation, but matters less
for anything else. The eclectic reality emerging from the case studies
demonstrates the disconnection between a corporation’s tax residence
and its substantive economic attributes. This reaffirms organizational
literature on the decentralized nature of the modern MNC. Corporate
tax-residence is not a good proxy for corporate attributes that
policymakers may wish to have in their home jurisdictions. If that is the
case, it is probably preferable to discount the importance of taxresidence as a target of policy making to the extent such policy is
intended to achieve non-tax goals. Instead, policymaking efforts should
specifically be aimed at the desired attributes. For example, if
policymakers believe R&D creates certain positive effects in the
jurisdiction in which it is located, they should target R&D specifically,
inducing MNCs to locate their R&D centers in the home jurisdiction330
rather than targeting residence as a proxy for R&D.
Finally, it should be noted that the case studies are not in conflict with
the vast literature on the effects of tax on capital locational decisions.
Tax possibly plays a role in driving meaningful dislocations of
management attributes (for example, in the case of Nobel), but in cases
where such dislocations are also supported by non-tax business
rationales. In such cases, business considerations may outweigh the cost
of frictions, and tax is a marginal investment consideration. In turn, this
implies that developed jurisdictions should be able to determine
corporate tax-residence based on substantive factors, without fear of
competition from tax havens that cannot offer substantive locational
benefits. Tax-residence competition may still be an issue to the extent
that developed jurisdictions offer similar comparative benefits. This
suggests that as long as corporate tax rates are set at rates similar to other
developed jurisdictions, it is possible to determine tax-residence based
on substantive factors without worrying about substantive dislocations
from one developed jurisdiction to another.

330. Inducing MNCs to have their R&D centers in a jurisdiction may be achieved using multiple
tools such as an education system that produces a skilled labor force, building relevant
infrastructure, or through tax incentives for R&D activity. This policy issue is beyond the scope of
this Article. Most industrialized jurisdictions offer various incentives which directly target R&D.
See Directorate for Science, Technology and Innovation, Measuring R&D Tax Incentives, OECD,
http://www.oecd.org/sti/rd-tax-stats.htm (last visited Jan. 16, 2015).
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CONCLUSION
Taxes are an important consideration in the context of investment
decisions. But they are many times secondary to real business
considerations. 331 Empirical literature that suggests that inversion
transactions will cause dislocation of meaningful attributes ignores this
simple truth. Due to the decentralized nature of MNCs, meaningful
attributes may not leave a home jurisdiction following an inversion,
simply because it is not necessarily the case such attributes were in the
home jurisdiction to begin with. And if they were located in the home
jurisdiction, there is no reason to assume such attributes will be
dislocated in conjunction with a change in tax residence, if it makes no
business sense to do so.
Taking a case studies approach, the Article developed observationbased constructs that describe the possible meaningful effects of
corporate inversions in the home jurisdiction. Such constructs should not
be viewed as empirical conclusions, but rather as providing an
opportunity for more nuanced empirical research on corporate
inversions. Future empirical study of corporate inversions should move
beyond the binary variables of tax relocation and study the effects of
inversions on multiple corporate functions as a matter of degree.
Two conclusions, however, can be stated based on the observations
made in this Article. First, an answer to the question whether inversions
are associated with meaningful dislocation in the home jurisdiction is
highly contextualized. It cannot be simply stated that an inversion results
(or does not result) in meaningful dislocations. Various factors interact
in different ways to bring about dislocations. While tax may indeed
serve as an incentive to meaningfully dislocate, it seems to be a
secondary consideration to other factors.
Second, there seems to be an inherent tension between the desire to
locate a headquarters where business opportunities can be exploited on
the one hand, and tax savings on the other. It is clear that non-tax
considerations play an important role in MNCs’ decisions whether to

331. The Foundation of International Tax Reform: Worldwide, Territorial, and Something in
Between: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 110th Cong. 32 (2008) (statement of Robert H.
Dilworth, McDermott, Will & Emery) (“I have never actually met a businessman (or even a tax
executive) who was actually involved in decision-making about the tax issues of where to locate a
business (that actually employed people) who would agree that his MNC employer acted to invest
somewhere because of an interest-free loan of residual U.S. corporate tax if the company invested in
a foreign country rather than the United States. Businesses follow customers, efficient delivery of
material and productive work forces to such an extent that tax incentives are often just an
afterthought.”).
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dislocate meaningful attributes, even where tax incentives to invert exist.
This implies that it is easier for MNCs to engage in tax-induced
inversions if they are able to shift their tax-residence without incurring
the high cost of shifting real economic structures. Conversely, the need
to change the location of meaningful economic attributes may operate as
a deterrent to inversion, which in turn may support both the tax base and
the economic factors in the home jurisdiction.

